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An old Russian proverb expresses the simple truth that a future
outcome remains an uncertainty and that—at the present time—it
could go one way or the other.1 This adage readily describes the
situation in the Russian Federation today and, more specifically for
the purposes of this Article, the nature of the recently amended
1. The proverb reads accordingly in the original Russian: “
.”
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law on non-governmental organizations (NGOs), passed by the
Duma and signed by then President Vladimir Putin in early 2006.2
Longtime observers of Russia increasingly have called attention
to and expressed profound concern for the direction the Russian
Federation has taken in recent years.3 In advancing President
Putin’s vision of “dictatorship of law”4 and “managed democracy,”5
the Russian government has retreated from key democratic
reforms, undermining the transition away from Soviet rule and
imperiling significant gains in fundamental human rights. Indeed,
a direct correlation may be made between the steep decline
regarding human rights during the past few years and the “rise of
authoritarian trends”6 in the Russian Federation. Foremost among
the discouraging developments indicating the halt—if not reversal—of democratic progress in Russia is the escalation in state persecution of “socially active” groups and individuals through
employment of unfair and “obviously selective” methods “directed
against those who are not liked by the authorities or . . . individual
officials,”7 the consolidation of state control over media outlets,8
and imposition of tighter restrictions on “non-traditional” religious
communities and NGOs, particularly those undertaking human
rights activities.9
According to the U.S. Department of State:
Continuing centralization of power in the executive branch, a
compliant State Duma, political pressure on the judiciary, intolerance of ethnic minorities, corruption and selectivity in
2. This Article refers to Vladimir Putin as President, reflecting his position at the
time of writing. He is now Prime Minister.
3. The terms Russia and the Russian Federation are used interchangeably herein.
4. Robin Shepherd, Editorial, Putin’s Russia Fails Its Own Test Laws and Freedoms, INT’L
HERALD TRIB., Oct. 21, 2006, at 6.
5. Serge Schmemann, When the Bear Cries Wolf: Trying to Understand Vladimir Putin,
N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2007, at A22.
6. John Finerty, Helsinki Commission Examines Current State of Human Rights and Democracy in Russia, HELSINKI COMMISSION DIG., Aug. 12, 2005 (quoting Valentin Gefter, General
Director of the Human Rights Institute and Galina Starovoitova Fellow on Human Rights
and Conflict Resolution at the Kennan Institute), available at http://www.csce.gov/index.
cfm?Fuseaction=ContentRecords.ViewDetail&ContentRecord_id=102&Region_id=101&
Issue_id=0&ContentType=G&ContentRecordType=G&CFID=1641558&CFTOKEN=45997
393.
7. Id.
8. Andrew E. Kramer, 50% Good News Is the Bad News in Russian Radio, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 22, 2007, at A1.
9. U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (USCIRF), CHALLENGE TO CIVIL SOCIETY: RUSSIA’S AMENDED LAW ON NONCOMMERCIAL ORGANIZATIONS 6 (2007), available at
http://www.uscirf.gov/images/stories/pdf/russia_ngo_report_final_march5.pdf [hereinafter CHALLENGE TO CIVIL SOCIETY].
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enforcement of the law, continuing media restrictions and selfcensorship, and harassment of some [NGOs] resulted in an erosion of the accountability of government leaders to the
population.10

Furthermore, the U.S. Commission on International Religious
Freedom (USCIRF) reported that actions and statements by Russian officials “indicate a declining level of tolerance for unfettered
NGO activity, particularly for those NGOs receiving foreign funding,” and a number of NGOs have alleged that lengthy government
investigations of their finances and other tactics are used to restrict
their activities.11 In the same vein, Human Rights Watch concluded that Russia’s internal crackdown on independent voices signals an intent to rebuild “a sphere of influence, especially among
the nations of the former Soviet Union, even if that means embracing tyrants and murderers.”12
Although Russia is a state party to major regional and international human rights treaties, including the European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
(European Convention)13 and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR),14 government officials have challenged universally recognized human rights principles, as well as
the overarching validity of human rights advocacy in Russia, charging that both are being used for political purposes. In President
Putin’s not-so-subtle words, “[w]hen speaking of common values,
we should . . . respect the historical diversity of European civilisation. It would be useless and wrong to try to force artificial ‘standards’ on each other.”15 On international funding of NGOs, Putin
10. BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, RUSSIA:
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES – 2006, introduction (2007), http://
www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/78835.htm.
11. CHALLENGE TO CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 9, at 6.
12. Kenneth Roth, Filling the Leadership Void: Where Is the European Union?, Introduction
to HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 1, 1 (2007), available at http://hrw.org/wr2k7/.
13. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, Europ. T.S. No. 5 [hereinafter European Convention]. The European Convention ultimately led to the establishment of a full-time European Court of Human Rights
(ECHR), boasting an expansive jurisdiction and the ability to bind parties to its judgments.
See Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Restructuring the Control Machinery Established Thereby arts. 1, 32, 46,
May 11, 1994, Europ. T.S. No. 155. Russia ratified the European Convention on May 5,
1998.
14. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N.
Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966). Russia ratified the International Convention on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) on Oct. 16, 1973.
15. Vladimir Putin, Europe Has Nothing to Fear from Russia’s Aspirations, FIN. TIMES, Nov.
22, 2006, at 19.
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is blunter: “What bothers us? I can say—and I think that it is clear
for all—that when these nongovernmental organizations are
financed by foreign governments, we see them as an instrument
that foreign states use to carry out their Russian policies.”16 To be
certain, this characterization has heightened the vulnerability of
Russia’s human rights advocates and those they defend, and has
undermined the value and content of international law.
It is against this backdrop that, in January 2006, President Putin
ratified major amendments to the 1996 Law on Nonprofit Organizations (NGO law), which regulates the creation, reorganization,
activity, and liquidation of NGOs in Russia.17 Putin has claimed
that the amendments to the NGO law are “aimed at preventing the
intrusion of foreign states into Russia’s internal political life and
[creating] favorable and transparent conditions for the financing
of [NGOs].”18 He also has stated that the law is needed to “combat
terrorism and stop foreign spies using NGOs as cover.”19 Nikolai
16. Matthew Schofield, Putin Cracks Down on Nongovernmental Organizations,
MCCLATCHY, Feb. 20, 2007, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/190/story/15642.html.
17. Federal Law on Introducing Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation, 2006, No. 18-FZ, arts. 2, 3 available at http://www.usig.org/countryinfo/
russia.asp (scroll down to “Applicable Laws”). Fed. Law No. 18-FZ amends Federal Law on
Nonprofit Organizations, 1996, No. 7-FZ, available at http://www.legislationline.org/legislation.php?tid=2&lid=644&less=false, and also includes a series of similar amendments for
Federal Law on Public Associations, 1995, No. 82-FZ, available at http://www.usig.org/
countryinfo/russia.asp (scroll down to “Applicable Laws”). Fed. Law. No. 7-FZ and Fed.
Law. No. 82-FZ are essentially identical, and NGOs in Russia can elect either framework for
registration purposes. In this Article, the terms “nonprofit organization,” “public association,” and “NGO” are used interchangeably. Analysis of the law on nonprofit organizations
(NGO law) is based on English translations of the original Russian legislation prepared by
a number of sources, including the Federal News Service (FNS) and the International
Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL). The author benefited greatly from linguistic clarifications and other consultations concerning aspects of Russian law provided by a number of
Russia specialists and expresses thanks especially to Natalia Bourjaily at ICNL.
18. Barry F. Lowenkron, Assistant Sec’y for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor,
Testimony at a Hearing of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe:
Human Rights, Civil Society, and Democratic Governance in Russ. (Feb. 8, 2006), available
at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/rm/2006/68669.htm.
19. Elif Kaban, Foreign Humanitarian Agencies Suspend Work in Russia, REUTERS, Oct. 19,
2006, available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/ngos/state/2006/1019suspend.htm. This is
not a new allegation. In 1999, Putin claimed foreign intelligence agencies were using environmental groups as cover for agency operations. Sarah E. Mendelson, The Putin Path:
Civil Liberties and Human Rights in Retreat, PROBS. OF POST-COMMUNISM, Sept.-Oct. 2000, at 3,
7. Russia raised similar claims during the Cold War era. Within the United Nations Economic and Social Committee (ECOSOC), the Soviet delegation “several times criticized
infringement of national sovereignty by . . . Western-dominated civil rights NGOs.” Kjell
Skjelsbaek, The Growth of International Nongovernmental Organization in the Twentieth Century,
25 INT’L ORG. 420, 433 n.29 (1971) (citation omitted). Furthermore, in 1967, the New York
Times reported that the CIA had secretly funded several anti-communist NGOs, triggering
a reappraisal of the role of NGOs at the United Nations (U.N.), driven in large part by the
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Patrushev, head of the Russian Federalnaya Sluzhba Bezopasnost or
Federal Security Service (FSB), repeated this viewpoint in December 2006, publicly accusing international NGOs of harboring foreign spies.20 According to Patrushev, Russia had seen a “sharp
increase” in espionage under the cover of such international organizations.21 While these rationales are not stated explicitly in the
text of the amended NGO law, they suggest a more ominous
intent.
This Article seeks to provide a detailed analysis of the provisions
of the amended NGO law, with an eye to exposing the human
rights implications of a law that is both menacingly overbroad and
blatantly discriminatory in its form and content. The purpose of
this exercise is to alert legal scholars, international lawyers, policy
makers, and NGO activists both in Russia and elsewhere to the
obfuscatory and mostly bureaucratic nature by which a government
is seeking to stifle and assert control over a vital sector of civil society. Already, there are alarming signs that other countries are prepared to follow in kind by instituting similar regulatory measures.22
This unfolding reality represents a testament to the warning flags
raised in an earlier article concerning the regulation of NGOs23
and serves as a critical test for the international community, as well
as an opportunity for the NGO community to introduce more
authoritative, uniform, and meaningful standards within their
Communist bloc as well as African and Asian states. Robert C. Blitt, Who Will Watch the
Watchdogs? Human Rights NGOs and the Case for Regulation, 10 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 261,
358. At the same time, governments historically have leveled charges of bias and politicization against arguably independent NGOs. Id. For example, the U.S.S.R. accused Amnesty
International and other human rights NGOs of abusing “their consultative status [at the
U.N.] by engaging in slander and political attacks on member states.” Id. (quoting PEIHENG CHIANG, NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AT THE UNITED NATIONS: IDENTITY,
ROLE, AND FUNCTION 189 (1981)).
20. Simon Saradzhyan, Patrushev Says More Spies Work in NGOs, MOSCOW TIMES, Dec.
20, 2006, at 3.
21. Id.; Schofield, supra note 16. Other Russian authorities contend that “many
groups posing as NGOs are actually criminal or terrorist organizations.” Oksana
Yablokova, NGOs Face Paperwork Hurdle, MOSCOW TIMES, Oct. 17, 2006, available at 2006
WLNR 17950955.
22. One such country is Peru. Eduardo Bertoni, Presentation at the ABA International Spring Meeting, Recent Developments in International NGO Activities: Building
Credible Self-Accountability Principles in an Age of Increasing Government Regulation
(May 3, 2007); see also April Howard, Peru: Congress Passes Anti-NGO Law, UPSIDE DOWN
WORLD, Dec. 12, 2006, http://upsidedownworld.org/main/content/view/543/68/. Similar developments may be seen in Ethiopia. See Peter Heinlein, US Says Draft Ethiopian NGO
Law Would ‘Close Political Space’ VOA News, October 21, 2008, http://www.voanews.com/
english/2008-10-21-voa68.cfm.
23. See generally Blitt, supra note 19 (arguing that self-regulation of NGOs will be crucial to their responsible growth).
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industry as a means of preempting accusations of the kind being
leveled by President Putin and his associates.
After providing some historical background on NGO operations
and related developments in Russia, the following chapters of this
Article will introduce and analyze key sections of the NGO law,
measure the provisions of the law against domestic, regional, and
international standards related to the formation and operation of
NGOs, and discuss the impact of the NGO law based on its initial
enforcement since coming into effect. The Article will conclude by
exploring implications for Russia’s civil society within the broader
context of political developments in that country, as well as measures that may be taken to minimize the impact of the NGO law
and ensure that organizations are able to operate freely and without undue restrictions.
II.

“THIS HAPPENED LONG AGO AND ISN’T TRUE”: A BRIEF
OVERVIEW OF NGOS AND RELATED LEGAL
DEVELOPMENTS IN RUSSIA
A.

NGO Life Back in the U.S.S.R.?

The Russian proverb “this happened long ago and isn’t true”
brushes off the painful reminder of an actual unpleasant event by
employing sarcasm. It is particularly apropos for addressing the
historical experience of NGOs during the Soviet era, as well as
related political developments leading up to today.24 Like all other
aspects of public life, NGOs were not spared from the domineering, omnipresent role asserted by the Communist party. Essentially, the premise and action of the state government eliminated
any possibility for establishing conventional, independent NGOs.25
Simply put, “No organized interest group was permitted within the
Soviet system.”26 As a consequence, all semblances of activism and
organization were channeled through communist-controlled bod24. The proverb reads accordingly in the original Russian: “
.”
25. See Ivan Kurilla, Civil Activism Without NGOs: The Communist Party as a Civil Society
Substitute, 10 DEMOKRATIZATSIYA 392 (2002), available at 2002 WLNR 5273016.
26. Id. “The Soviet state monopolized political power, ruthlessly suppressing any
organization that dared even to think of opposing it. State power reached deep into the
homes of its citizens, repressing the most innocent and innocuous expression of free
thought.” Tom Lantos, Putting Democracy First in Relations with Russia, FLETCHER F. WORLD
AFF., Summer 2005, at 13, 15. James Richter also concludes that “the Soviet regime
banned independent public activism altogether.” James Richter, Evaluating Western Assistance to Russian Women’s Organizations, in THE POWER AND LIMITS OF NGOS: A CRITICAL
LOOK AT BUILDING DEMOCRACY IN EASTERN EUROPE AND EURASIA 54, 58 (Sarah E. Mendelson & John K. Glenn eds., 2002).
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ies,27 which “depended upon the regime for funding and personnel and often acted as a means of social control rather than of
individual empowerment.”28 Confronted with this reality, many
Russian citizens chose to forgo the public arena and focused on
the already difficult task of taking care of themselves and their family members. Even in the face of this tight control, approved Soviet
NGOs were still subject to regulation under the All-Union Law on
Public Associations.29 This all-encompassing legislation addressed
the registration and operation of “political parties, trade unions,
and all non-governmental membership organizations.”30
Ironically, some scholars have argued that the term “nongovernmental organization” was “planted” in the “lexicon of international
diplomacy” by Joseph Stalin.31 In 1934, the U.S.S.R. decided to
join the International Labor Organization (ILO),32 the only “tripartite” U.N. agency (formerly League of Nations agency) that
“brings together representatives of governments, employers and
workers to jointly shape policies and programmes.”33 At the time,
Western labor leaders alleged that the Soviet’s management and
labor delegates to the ILO were not independent, but merely additional arms of the government.34 The Kremlin insisted that the
impugned components of the Soviet tripartite delegation were
“entirely non-governmental organizations.”35 In fact, it appears
that earlier usage of the term NGO can be found readily in both
27. C.J. Albertie, A Survey & Critique of Russian Law & Its Effect on NGOs, 2 INT’L J. CIV.
SOC’Y L. 12, 14-15 (2004). Russia’s Tsarist period also hints at a dearth of organization and
activity on the part of civil society in the face of government monitoring of “all forms of
civic activism.” Richter, supra note 26, at 58.
28. Richter, supra note 26, at 58.
29. See Richard Remias, The Regulation of the NGO in Central Asia: Current Reforms and
Ongoing Problems, HARV. ASIA Q., Summer 2000, at 18.
30. Id.
31. Jeremy Rabkin, Paper Delivered at an American Enterprise Institute Conference:
Why the Left Dominates NGO Advocacy Networks, at 2 (June 11, 2003), available at http://
www.aei.org/events/eventID.329,filter.all/event_detail.asp.
32. National Labour Law Profile: Russian Federation, http://www.ilo.org/public/
english/dialogue/ifpdial/info/national/rus.htm.
33. About the ILO, http://www.ilo.org/global/About_the_ILO/lang—en/index.htm
(last visited May 31, 2008).
34. The same concern for the independent nature of the Soviet “tripartite” delegation to the International Labor Organization (ILO) resurfaced in 1954 when that country
decided to renew its participation in ILO activities after a 17-year hiatus (following a Soviet
boycott of the organization in 1937 and its subsequent expulsion from the League of
Nations in 1940). See Alvin Z. Rubinstein, The USSR and the ILO, 14 RUSS. REV. 11, 15
(1955); Harold Karan Jacobson, The USSR and ILO, 14 INT’L ORG. 402, 402 (1960).
35. Rabkin, supra note 31, at 2.
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the relevant literature and international practice dating back at
least ten years before the Soviets’ use of the term.36
Nevertheless, what is evident from the ILO incident is that NGOs
under communist rule were for practical purposes either non-existent or so far removed from any conventionally accepted definition
of an NGO37 as to be something altogether different and that
“[e]ven Soviet ‘trade unions’ appeared to be labor departments of
the same state-party machine.”38 As confirmation of this reality,
despite the Soviet Union’s admittance to the ILO, that body’s Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations did not hesitate to disclose Soviet shortcomings with
respect to the fundamental right to freedom of association.39 For
example, in 1979, the Committee of Experts concluded that “provisions of Soviet law were incompatible” with Article 2 of ILO Convention No. 87 on Freedom of Association and Protection of the
Right to Organize, 1948, and that the role of the Communist party
violated also Article 3 of that Convention.40 Articles 2 and 3(2)
provide:
2. Workers and employers, without distinction whatsoever, shall
have the right to establish and, subject only to the rules of the
organisation concerned, to join organisations of their own choosing
without previous authorisation.
....
3(2). The public authorities shall refrain from any interference which
would restrict this right or impede the lawful exercise thereof.41

Ultimately, the 65th International Labor Conference adopted
the Committee’s report, “despite objections made by the representative of the Soviet Government in the (tripartite) Conference
Committee on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations,”42 essentially confirming the reality that “[a]ll the civic activism that appeared in the Soviet era was [being] channeled into
existing party/state-controlled organizations.”43
36. Steve Charnovitz, Nongovernmental Organizations and International Law, 100 AM. J.
INT’L L. 348, 351 (2006) (tracing the term to “just after World War I,” with some indication
that it may have been used even earlier).
37. For a discussion concerning competing definitions of the term “NGO” and
problems related to those definitions, see Blitt, supra note 19, at 279-82.
38. Kurilla, supra note 25.
39. Theodor Meron, Violations of ILO Conventions by the USSR and Czechoslovakia, 74 AM.
J. INT’L L. 206, 206 (1980).
40. Id. at 207.
41. Convention Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to
Organize, arts. 2, 3, July 4, 1950, 68 U.N.T.S. 18 (emphasis added).
42. Meron, supra note 39, at 207.
43. Kurilla, supra note 25.
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Transition to Post-Soviet Russia: Opening and Uncertainty

From this inauspicious historical experience, observers of the
“third sector”44 in Russia could only feel a sense of hope in the face
of the Soviet Union’s demise. In particular, Mikhail Gorbachev’s
reform efforts related to perestroika and glasnost triggered “the rise
of optimism concerning the prospects for the emergence of independent social organizations” and, indeed, the proliferation—
“with astonishing rapidity”—of such independent, informal
groups.45 This rapid growth of the NGO sector continued through
the dramatic political developments of 1991 and was viewed as “a
rare sign of hope in an otherwise bleak economic and political
landscape.”46
By 1997, reports estimated that over 50,000 Russian NGOs had
registered with the Ministry of Justice in the short period of six
years.47 Despite the dramatic numerical increase in NGOs, the
early 1990s failed to produce an “autonomous third sector, either
in practice or in mentality, and there were no effective links
between local government and independent groups.”48 Confronted with this reality, Russian scholars reached a “consensus that
the hopes for the flourishing of civil society . . . had largely . . .
disappointed,”49 and they concluded that NGOs played only a marginal role “on the periphery of social development.”50 Indeed,
even the term “NGO” was slow in taking root within Russia.
According to one survey taken in Siberia, only 26 percent of the
44. The term “third sector” is used by Russians when describing “the realm in which
. . . independent associations and initiatives take place . . . . Though some scholars make a
distinction between a civil society and a third sector, the terms tend to be used interchangeably in the Russian literature.” Marcia A. Weigle, On the Road to the Civic Forum: State
and Civil Society from Yeltsin to Putin, 10 DEMOKRATIZATSIYA 117, 118 (2002) (footnote
omitted).
45. Alfred B. Evans Jr., Recent Assessments of Social Organizations in Russia, 10 DEMOKRATIZATSIYA 322, 322-23 (2002).
46. Richter, supra note 26, at 57.
47. Id. Other estimates claim Russia’s third sector boasted 50,000 organizations in
1993 and 66,000 in 1997. Weigle, supra note 44, at 123. Others claimed 60,000 such
groups by 1990. Evans Jr., supra note 45, at 323.
48. Weigle, supra note 44, at 131. Cf. Kurilla, supra note 25 (“In the early 1990s, communist organizations composed the only existing nationwide network of civil activists.
Newly democratic networks did appear in the big cities, or in the regions with diverse
economic and social structures. However, in [some smaller] cities . . . the only alternative
that appeared at the time was a Cossack revival organization.”).
49. See Evans Jr., supra note 45, at 324.
50. Id. at 325. K.G. Kholodkovsky and others concluded that “the civil society that was
emerging in Russia . . . had not come close to fulfilling its potential several years later” and
had acquired “deformed or distorted . . . features.” Id. at 324.
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population could name an NGO in 1995; by 1997, the figure had
increased only slightly to 32 percent.51
This gap between expectation and reality stemmed from a number of diverse factors, which forced those who tried to build Russian civil society to confront “a chaotic, even hostile,
environment.”52 In the first instance, while the number of NGOs
may have increased significantly, the economic upheaval associated
with the transition away from communism “caused most Russians
to worry about more immediate, tangible goals than raising public
consciousness.”53 Deeper still, Russian scholars recognized that
contemporary Russian society had been tainted by a “postcommunist syndrome,” which bred “pervasive mutual alienation and
distrust among citizens” and discouraged “most Russian citizens
from participating voluntarily in the work of independent social
organizations that attempt to change society from the bottom
up.”54
Political, cultural, and legal aspects of post-Soviet life also contributed to exacerbating the obstacles hampering development of
the “third sector.” For example, “some conservative elements of
society and the government” viewed newly established NGOs as a
potential “threat to their power and control over resources.”55 To
counter this perceived threat, political elites discouraged activism
during the initial phases of postcommunist state construction,
thereby frustrating the ability of independent activism to flourish
freely.56 Furthermore, an underdeveloped legal system meant that
independent groups lacked a supportive framework that could
facilitate their operations.57 For example, Russia retained a tax
51. Eliza K. Klose, NGO Image: Are Community Attitudes Changing? GIVE & TAKE, Spring
1999, at 3.
52. Richter, supra note 26, at 59.
53. Id. at 58. Russian scholars have confirmed this trend with regard to the environmental movement: “[B]y the middle of the 1990s, most people in Russia were so deeply
engaged in a struggle to survive and were so ‘morally depressed’ that they were unable to
serve as the basis for an environmentalist movement.” Evans Jr., supra note 45, at 326
(quoting Oleg N. Ianitsky, Ekologicheskoe dvizhenie v Rossii: kriticheskii analiz (Moscow:
Rossiiskaia Akademiia Nauk, Institut Sotsiologii, 1996), 118.).
54. Evans Jr., supra note 45, at 325. This distrust was viewed as a “reaction to the often
phony collectivism that was imposed by the party-state regime.” Id. Yet, it is also “inimical
to the growth of independent social organizations, in which interpersonal trust is an indispensable element of social capital for those seeking to develop organized, cooperative
endeavors.” Id. at 333.
55. Yuri Dzhibladze, Russian NGOs Fight for Fair Taxation, GIVE & TAKE, Winter 1999, at
4, 5.
56. See Weigle, supra note 44, at 119.
57. See id. at 119-20.
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code that offered little incentive for fostering philanthropy,58 and
most citizens continued to view charitable organizations as a form
of “organized theft.”59
C.

The 1995 Federal Law on Public Associations

The Russian Constitution, ratified in 1993, held out the promise
of broadly defined individual civil liberties and human rights,
including “the right to association,” and the guarantee of “freedom
of public association activities.”60 Yet when the Duma did promulgate a new Federal Law on Public Associations in 1995,61 it retained
“ambiguous regulations and arbitrary powers of government.”62
These flaws were in line with much of the legislation being passed
during this period across the Former Soviet Union (FSU) to
replace Soviet law. For example, the Federal Law on Security,
passed in 1992, was criticized for reflecting “Soviet-style legalistic
thought” because it contained “enough qualifications and exceptions [so as] to legalize continued abuse of power.”63 The law also
facilitated a legal foundation that “grants the former KGB many of
the powers it . . . enjoyed under the Soviet regime to repress individuals and groups who displease the government or the special
services.”64 Likewise, the 2002 Federal Law on the Counteraction
of Extremist Activity, sometimes called “the extremism law,”
includes a lengthy yet vague catch-all definition of extremist activity,65 which continues to be enlarged today.66 The extremism law
58. Richter, supra note 26, at 59. Among other things, the tax code can be used to
treat NGOs like commercial businesses by taxing international grants as profits, making
NGOs contribute to the pension funds of individuals benefiting from their services, and
forcing those beneficiaries to pay taxes on the value of any NGO assistance received. See
John Squier, Civil Society and the Challenge of Russian Gosudarstvennost, 10 DEMOKRATIZATSIYA
166, 173-72 (2002).
59. Evans Jr., supra note 45, at 326.
60. Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Konst. RF] [Constitution] art. 30(1).
61. Federal Law on Public Associations, 1995, No. 82-FZ, available at http://
www.legislationline.org/legislation.php?tid=2&lid=640&less=false.
62. See Remias, supra note 29, at 19. Remias notes that, in most cases across the Former Soviet Union (FSU), the text of the laws was not changed, and only cosmetic amendments were made to reflect newfound independence. See id.
63. J. Michael Waller, Russia’s Legal Foundations for Civil Repression: Are Soviet Practices
Being Reformed or Legalized? 1 DEMOKRATIZATSIYA 110, 110-11 (1993).
64. Id. at 110.
65. Federal Law on the Counteraction of Extremist Activity, 2002, No. 114-FZ, art. 1,
available at http://www.legislationline.org/legislation.php?tid=46&lid=634&less=false.
66. The Duma amended this law in 2006, expanding the definition of extremist activities to include “humiliating national merit,” “public slander of state officials,” and “hampering the lawful activity of state organs.” Putin Approves Controversial “Anti-Extremism” Law,
KHALEEJ TIMES, July 29, 2006, http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticleNew.asp?xfile=
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has been labeled “an invitation to abuse”67 and a threat to the
operation of religious communities “through a tightening of registration and liquidation procedures as well as . . . arbitrary application.”68 Numerous other laws passed in post-Soviet Russia bear
similar hallmarks of state interference and a curtailment of individual freedoms, including the 1997 Federal Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations.69 Later, this Article addresses
how some of these various laws interact with one another to further
limit civic life in Russia.70
Among other things, the public associations law established a
deadline by which NGOs founded before 1994 were required to reregister with the Federal Ministry of Justice (or through regional
and local departments and agencies) and mandated liquidation
proceedings for any organization that failed to meet the deadline.71 The U.S. Department of State concluded that it was “difficult to assess the scope of the [liquidation] problem due to the
large number of registered NGO’s [sic] that exist only on paper, as
well as the large number of active but unregistered organizations.”72 Human rights activists, however, contended that human
data/theworld/2006/July/theworld_July847.xml&section=theworld&col; see also News
Alert, Comm. to Protect Journalists, Russia: President Signs Law Labeling Criticism of State
Officials “Extremism” (July 28, 2006), http://www.cpj.org/news/2006/europe/russia28
july06na.html. The law was most recently amended in July 2007 to punish “public support,” “help,” and “appeals” for extremism, and to ban the dissemination of information
about NGOs and other groups whose activity has been labeled extremist. Press Release,
Reporters Without Borders, Free Expression Under Threat from Law That Would Step up
Fight Against “Extremism,” (July 24, 2007), http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=
23034. See infra Part IV.D for a discussion of how the “extremism law” intersects with the
NGO law.
67. MICHAEL MCCLINTOCK, EVERYDAY FEARS: A SURVEY OF VIOLENT HATE CRIMES IN
EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA 69 (2005), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/discrimination/pdf/everyday-fears-080805.pdf. For more on the extremism law, see Russia
Passes Extremism Law, BBC News, June 27, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/
2069309.stm.
68. J. Brian Gross, Russia’s War on Political and Religious Extremism: An Appraisal of the
Law “On Counteracting Extremist Activity,” 2003 BYU L. REV. 717, 752.
69. See, e.g., Federal Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations, 1997,
No. 125-FZ, available at http://www.legislationline.org/legislation.php?tid=2&lid=584&
less=false. See infra note 132 (discussing the law in greater detail).
70. See discussion infra Part IV.D.
71. Yelena Grishina et al., Report on the Violations Committed in the Course of Registration
and Re-Registration of Public Associations in the Russian Federation in 1999, 2 INT’L J. NOT-FORPROFIT L. § 1 (2000), http://www.icnl.org/KNOWLEDGE/IJNL/vol2iss4/art_6.htm.
72. BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, RUSSIA:
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES – 1999, § 2.b (2000), http://www.state.
gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/1999/356.htm. The State Department report acknowledged that
“there were several high profile cases in which well-known activists or organizations were
refused re-registration—such as Sergey Grigoriants’ Glasnost Foundation and environ-
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rights and environmental organizations were most vulnerable
under the law and that “a significant number of public associations
were denied re-registration, either on illegal grounds, or on the
basis of far-fetched and formal pretexts.”73 According to these
activists:
Many organizations were pressured by justice departments to
change the name of their organization or its statutory goals.
Organizations were forced to comply, for fear of losing their
legal status and endangering the well-being of the people they
serve. There are good reasons to believe that regional and local
authorities used the requirement for NGOs to re-register as an
opportunity to get rid of “undesirable” organizations which criticize the authorities’ actions in certain areas or suggest alternative remedies.74

The Glasnost Public Foundation, one of the Russian government’s most vocal critics, observed that the uniformity of reasons
given for denial of re-registration was “strongly suggestive of a centrally coordinated policy, even though no ‘smoking gun’ has
appeared in the form of a memorandum or other directive
instructing officials to deny registration to particular organizations
or categories of organization.”75
Despite these obstacles, a survey completed in the late 1990s of
U.S. foundations operating grant programs in the FSU found that
the NGO movement “had made great strides,” with “growth in
both the number and sophistication of NGOs, especially in countries like . . . Russia.”76 For example, the Ford Foundation
reported that Russian NGOs:
mentalist Aleksey Yablokov’s Ecology and Human Rights association—by regional departments of justice on grounds that these organizations [were] illegal and discriminatory.” Id.
73. Grishina et al., supra note 71, at summary.
74. Id. For example, a “very common requirement was the deletion of the phrase
‘protection of citizens’ rights’ from the organization’s name, statutory goals and objectives.”
Id. § 2 (emphasis added). These allegations were reiterated by at least one motion for a
resolution submitted in the Council of Europe (COE):
A large number of public associations (nearly half on the federal level) failed to
re-register in time; a number of other NGOs were forced to change their name or
statute to obtain re-registration; others were denied re-registration by the authorities. There are allegations that some regional and local authorities used the
requirement for NGOs to re-register as an opportunity to silence critical NGOs, in
particular those working in the field of human rights and on ecological issues.
EUR. PARL. ASS., Problems of Registration of Non-Governmental Organisations Dealing with Human
Rights in the Russian Federation, Doc. No. 8799 (July 8, 2000), available at http://assembly.
coe.int/main.asp?Link=/documents/workingdocs/doc00/edoc8799.htm.
75. Squier, supra note 58, at 172.
76. Eliza K. Klose, US Foundations Find Civil Society Is Taking Root: A Survey of Funders on
Third Sector Development, GIVE & TAKE, Summer 1998, at 24.
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show signs of influence and promise . . . . New types of cooperation between government and NGOs are emerging. On a federal level, several leading NGO representatives advise Duma
committees; in Russia’s regions, NGOs are increasingly looked
to by local administrations to share the burden of providing services. A few companies and banks now employ consultants to
advise them on charitable giving; the media, in particular the
press, is beginning to consider some NGO activities potentially
newsworthy.77

Nevertheless, funders observed that “the weak legal and financial
infrastructures for nonprofits create obstacles to NGO development . . . and contribute to the ongoing harassment of NGO activists,” and some concluded that “NGOs are still hindered by
inexperienced management, low credibility with the public, a lack
of media savvy, and the inability to build links with their own constituents or work in coalition with others.”78
D.

The 2001 Civic Forum

Much like President Putin has sought to bring the media, trade
unions, and religious communities within his control, the 2001
Civic Forum was “originally announced as a means of organizing
civil society organizations throughout Russia into a single corporatist body that would allow them an official consultative role with the
government.”79 In other words, it was “an effort to draw civil society into government structures,” as a means of further consolidating power.80 Unwilling to endorse the “sudden proliferation of
pseudo- or wholly government-organized ‘nongovernmental’ organizations (GONGOs) formed under the auspices of the Kremlin
. . . [some of which] diligently undertook the task of helping to
select Civic Forum participants from across Russia,”81 the NGO
community instead publicly “rejected Putin’s attempts to privilege
certain NGOs over others . . . and determine the composition and
orientation of the Civic Forum.”82 In the face of this outcry—and
the mounting realization that no legitimate civic forum could
77. Id. at 25 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
78. Id. at 26.
79. Squier, supra note 58, at 177.
80. Alexander Nikitin & Jane Buchanan, The Kremlin’s Civic Forum: Cooperation or Cooptation for Civil Society in Russia? 10 DEMOKRATIZATSIYA 147, 147 (2002).
81. Id. at 149. One such government-organized non-governmental organization
(GONGO) chose for itself the ironic name Grazhdanskoe Obshchestvo (Civil Society). Id. For
a brief discussion of the impact of GONGOs and other quasi-NGOs, see Blitt, supra note
19, at 330.
82. Weigle, supra note 44, at 117. Others felt “the early development of the Civil
Forum simply recalled too closely Soviet preparations for Communist Party Congresses,
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exclude respected and recognized leading NGOs83—the Kremlin
backed down from its initial vision, settling instead on a meeting
intended to start “a dialogue on how independent civil initiatives
can help address national problems.”84
To be certain, the two-day Civic Forum was unprecedented insofar as it brought President Putin and other senior administration
officials into direct contact with thousands of representatives from
Russia’s “third sector.”85 The actual face time, however, was brief.
In negotiating the opening plenary session, Putin’s handlers
required that NGO representatives be allowed to speak only after
the president and official state representatives.86 Putin promptly
excused himself from the plenary following four speeches from
official state representatives—“people with whom he meets virtually every day.”87 Other attending high officials soon followed
Putin out the door.88
In his address to the delegates, President Putin remarked that,
“[i]t is impossible to have a strong state, a flourishing and prosperous society, if there isn’t good relations [sic] of partnership
between the state and civic society,” and that the state has only one
task: to “create the most favorable environment to develop a civic
society.”89 Some observers described the Civic Forum, the occasion
for this speech, as “clearly afford[ing]” an opportunity for NGOs to
“consolidat[e] their gains and strengthen[ ] the consistency of civil
whose attendance would be limited to reliable . . . delegations hand-picked by [the] Kremlin.” Nikitin & Buchanan, supra note 80, at 148.
83. See Nikitin & Buchanan, supra note 80, at 149 (“The organizers came to understand that the absence of human rights, environmental, and other activist groups at the
forum could generate a split in society, encourage further critical commentary from the
domestic and foreign press, and possibly even inspire negative reactions from the West.”).
84. Kremlin Convenes NGO Forum, GIVE & TAKE, Winter 2002, at 4.
85. By 2001, activists estimated that the number of NGOs in Russia had risen to an
impressive 350,000, employing “about one million people who assist 20 million Russians.”
Weigle, supra note 44, at 123. It is worth reiterating here Weigle’s caveat concerning these
numbers:
[T]here is a substantial amount of self-reporting involved; not all of the registered
groups are active; some of the registered groups are fronts for criminal organizations; and others dissolve after a short existence. Despite tendencies toward number inflation, there has been an objective increase in the number of NGOs . . .
active throughout Russia.
Id. at 123-24.
86. Nikitin & Buchanan, supra note 80, at 157.
87. Id.
88. Id. President Putin also did not attend the closing plenary session. Id. at 159.
89. Francesca Mereu, Forum Aims to Foster Conditions for Civic Society, reprinted in CENTER
FOR DEF. INFO. WKLY., Nov. 23, 2001, http://www.cdi.org/russia/181-6.cfm.
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society development throughout Russia.”90 Others concluded that
Putin’s remarks embodied “the most murky and problematic developments in Russia: what the president says so eloquently very often
fails to correspond with events as they actually occur.”91
Whatever Putin’s true intention, as continuing trends since 2001
show, and as this Article will demonstrate, his speech by no means
signaled the start of a new relationship between the Russian government and NGOs. Some NGOs refused to participate in the
forum altogether, believing Russian authorities were “unlikely ever
to truly change their attitudes toward human rights.”92 Others criticized the event as “simply a public relations exercise organized by
the Kremlin.”93 As Dr. Grigory Yavlinsky, Chairman of the Russian
Democratic Party Yabloko, presciently commented, “I hope that
sensible people will not take the Civil Forum very seriously. It is a
one-time action that will end, while the issues of cooperation
between civil organizations will remain.”94 In the end, even the
working-level roundtable discussions held during the Civic Forum
failed to produce any concrete results, and “nothing permanent or
binding emerged from the two hectic days of meetings.”95 Moreover, despite much clamor in the press over the Civic Forum, Versty,
the national news service, concluded that the event “remained
unnoticed by the majority of Russians.”96 The event did prompt
90. Weigle, supra note 44, at 131-32. For a detailed—and fairly optimistic—account of
the lead-up to and outcome of the Civic Forum meeting, see generally id.
91. Nikitin & Buchanan, supra note 80, at 157. This analysis provides a useful contrast
to Weigle’s.
92. Mereu, supra note 89.
93. Id.
94. Kremlin Convenes NGO Forum, supra note 84, at 4. Cf. Civic Forum Winds Up on a
High Note, MOSCOW TIMES, Nov. 23, 2001, at 3 (providing a more optimistic report).
95. Nikitin & Buchanan, supra note 80, at 147. Ironically, Grigory Pasko, a Russian
journalist and environmentalist who delivered remarks on freedom of expression during
the closing session, was later convicted of treason and sentenced to serve four years in a
prison colony. Press Release, Amnesty International, Released Grigory Pasko Reiterates
His Innocence (Jan. 23, 2003), http://web.amnesty.org/web/content.nsf/pages/
gbrpasko. Pasko was released as part of a general amnesty after serving two-thirds of his
sentence. Id. Amnesty International declared Pasko a prisoner of conscience immediately
following his first arrest in 1997, finding that the Russian state was acting against him
“solely for exercising his basic human right to freedom of expression.” Id. According to
Freedom House, “Press freedom organizations regarded [Pasko’s] conviction as a politically motivated effort intended to punish [him] for reporting on the environmental dangers posed by the Russian navy’s nuclear-waste-dumping practices.” FREEDOM HOUSE,
FREEDOM IN THE WORLD – RUSSIA (2004), available at http://freedomhouse.org/inc/content/pubs/fiw/inc_country_detail.cfm?year=2004&country=3013&pf [hereinafter FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2004].
96. Nikitin & Buchanan, supra note 80, at 165 n.51 (quoting Natsionalnaia Sluzhba
Novostei, Dec. 11, 2001).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1016367

2008]

Eleven Russian Proverbs

19

the government, however, to take the rather ironic step of issuing
twenty-six public recommendations on civil society, including the
need for “further debureaucratization, greater governmental transparency, and the establishment of nongovernmental-governmental
cooperation committees.”97
E.

Writing on the Wall

It is difficult to write off the Civic Forum as a simple publicity
stunt, as it did provide some small measure of public recognition
for NGOs.98 At the same time, it is equally difficult to attribute
much to the fact that President Putin—for one ceremonial
moment—went “on record as recognizing the autonomy, diversity,
and policymaking potential of Russia’s NGOs” or enjoined government officials and regional leaders, “once dismissive or highly critical of NGO . . . activity[,] to both promote the activity of and
develop a partnership with civil society activists.”99 In fact, as the
following Sections will establish, the idea for the Civic Forum can
probably best be understood as a “trial balloon” floated to determine whether the government could co-opt NGOs. In the face of
vociferous opposition to that idea, the Civic Forum most likely
cemented in the minds of Putin and his Kremlin advisors the need
to look for other means of imposing controls on these independent and divergent voices.
To be certain, some of these other methods of control being utilized by the government were by no means subtle. Since Putin
took office, many advocacy groups “reported being harassed by
police, security, and tax agents, some of whom have been known to
barge unannounced into NGO offices and confiscate files while
dressed in ski masks and bearing assault weapons.”100 According to
a survey from 2000, “two-thirds of all Russians interviewed had difficulty labeling their society democratic.”101 A subsequent survey
found that 86 percent of the population agreed with the statement,
“People in positions of authority in a country absolutely don’t care
97. Id. at 161. The ironic and superficial nature of these recommendations is only
intensified in the face of the amended NGO law discussed herein.
98. See Weigle, supra note 44, at 117.
99. Id. at 137.
100. Leslie Powell, Western and Russian Environmental NGOs: A Greener Russia?, in THE
POWER AND LIMITS OF NGOS, supra note 26, at 126, 146.
101. Id. The All-Russian Center of Public Opinion Studies (VTsIOM) conducted this
survey in October 2000. Id. at 151 n.32. In September 2004, Russian authorities took control of VTsIOM, “the country’s most respected polling firm,” reportedly acting in response
to a “series of polls showing dwindling support for the ongoing war in Chechnya and
majority support for a negotiated solution.” FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2004, supra note 95.
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what happens to the citizens of that country.”102 Although a certain level of government harassment had existed prior to Putin’s
ascendance, by 2000, the pattern of journalists, “environmentalists,
human rights activists, and even academics—Russians but also
Americans and Europeans—who [were] intimidated, interrogated,
tailed, jailed, robbed, accused of treason, run out of the country,
and, [even] ‘disappeared,’ all by the federal authorities” had
become self-evident.103
Furthering this pattern, Putin in 2002 “moved to rein in the
often independent-minded”104 regional governors and—within two
years—outright eliminated their popular election.105 In place of
elections, Putin empowered himself to appoint regional governors
directly.106 This signaled a clear break from the approach taken by
Boris Yeltsin, Putin’s predecessor, and had far-ranging implications
across all branches of regional government.107 Yeltsin urged
regional leaders to grab “all the sovereignty you can swallow,”108
which resulted in regional leaders asserting “almost total control
over local courts and federal agencies”109 through negotiated
power-sharing treaties and other means.110 Thus, in one stroke,
Putin was able to dominate not only the executive arm of Russia’s
regional governments, but—by virtue of trickle down influence—
regional agencies and the local judiciary as well.111
102. Nikitin & Buchanan, supra note 80, at 160 (citation and internal quotations
omitted).
103. Mendelson, supra note 19, at 4.
104. FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD – RUSSIA (2002), available at http://
freedomhouse.org/inc/content/pubs/fiw/inc_country_detail.cfm?year=2002&country=
616&pf [hereinafter FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2002].
105. See Peter Baker, Putin’s Plan for Governors Only Confirms His Control, WASH. POST,
Sept. 16, 2004, at A28.
106. Id. Even before taking this step, some observers estimated that the Kremlin was
already selecting 90 percent of Russia’s governors and that “voting had lost much of its
meaning.” Id.
107. Alexander N. Domrin, From Fragmentation To Balance:The Shifting Model of Federalism
in Post-Soviet Russia, 15 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 515, 547-48 (2006).
108. Baker, supra note 105.
109. Dr. Nikolay Petrov, Remarks Before Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace: How Much Has Federal Power Increased Under President Putin? (Sept. 8, 2004),
available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/events/index.cfm?fa=eventDetail&id=
747.
110. See Robert Sharlet, Resisting Putin’s Federal Reforms on the Legal Front, 11 DEMOKRATIZATSIYA 335, 336 (2003).
111. It should be noted that many of the steps taken to consolidate power were
couched in the need to centralize power so as to better defend against Russia’s dismemberment at the hands of ethnic separatists and other similar threats to Russia’s national
sovereignty.
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At least one observer has sought to frame Putin’s actions in a
positive light, whereby the president “diagnosed the problem as
the progressive disintegration of the federation as a result of the
weakened authority of the central state and the federal legal system” and accordingly “prescribed a strong dose of recentralization”
to correct the existing division of powers that had been “unwisely
delegated from above, or unlawfully appropriate from below.”112
What is so remarkable about this analysis is that it fails to take into
account the parallel actions Putin’s administration undertook to
further consolidate power across all playing fields in Russian society. Given this greater context—of developments related to, inter
alia, press freedom, religious groups, NGOs, political parties, and
trade unions—it is unrealistic at best to suggest that Putin’s moves
were undertaken merely to “rebalance center-periphery relations
into a viable federal system.”113 At worst, the framing of Putin’s
actions as reflecting a “campaign for the unification of legal
space”114 sanitizes the reality of a campaign for unchecked and
unopposed power.
Putin also took direct action against the wealthy oligarchs who
seemingly controlled Russian politics prior to his election. In July
2000, he brought together a group of twenty leading businesspeople and flatly warned them that the only way they would be able to
keep their money was if they stayed out of politics.115 Those who
failed to abide by this bargain faced stiff consequences, including
tax evasion charges and other allegations brought about by government investigations.116
112. Sharlet, supra note 110, at 335-36.
113. Id. at 336.
114. Id. at 338. Sharlet concludes that “however frustrating [the campaign to re-centralize power was] for the federal officials involved, the net result has been positive for
Russia’s future development.” Id. at 341. The evidence submitted herein points to a very
different conclusion.
115. Jeffrey Kahn, The Search for the Rule of Law in Russia, 37 GEO. J. INT’L L. 353, 404
(2006).
116. For example, the ongoing Yukos Oil affair resulted in criminal and civil charges
against Platon Lebedev and Mikhail Khodorkovsky based on fraud, tax evasion, and other
allegations, but may have been motivated by the company’s open contributions to opposition political parties. See C.J. Chivers, New Charges in Russia Against Oil Executives, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 6, 2007, at A10 (“[Khodorkovsky’s] lawyers have framed his case . . . as an
example of government persecution that underscores Russia’s spotty record on human
rights and respect for the rule of law.”). Khodorkovsky and Lebedev were subsequently
sentenced to eight years in a Siberian prison camp. See id. The demise of Yukos has meant
“the rise of Rosneft, the state-controlled company that has acquired many of Yukos’s
assets.” Peter Finn, Sale of Building Seals Yukos’s Demise, WASH. POST, May 12, 2007, at A11.
Recently, Russian prosecutors leveled additional charges of embezzlement and money
laundering against Khodorkovsky and Lebedev, which could carry prison sentences of fif-
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With regard to the media, in 2004 the Russian government
seized the country’s last independent national television network,
“allegedly to settle the company’s debts.”117 In its annual Freedom in
the World report, Freedom House noted that this action “followed
similar takeovers that had resulted in government control of two
other independent television networks—NTV, in April 2001, and
TV-6, in January 2002.”118 According to the Committee to Protect
Journalists, “14 journalist murders committed since President Vladimir Putin took office in 2000 remain unsolved.”119 Most recently,
the October 2006 assassination of Russian investigative journalist
Anna Politkovskaya resulted in the silencing of one of Putin’s most
vocal critics of the ongoing war in Chechnya.120 According to
Human Rights Watch, “[t]here seemed little doubt she was killed
because of her work.”121
To be certain, the developments illustrated above confirm the
“creeping statism” that increasingly has come to characterize
Putin’s rule.122 As further affirmation of this trend, it is worth noting that between the years 2002 and 2004, Freedom House rated
Russia as “Partly Free” in its annual survey of freedom in the
world.123 In 2004, however, the organization issued a downward
trend arrow for Russia “due to increased state pressures on the
teen years. See Chivers, supra; see also Artyom Liss, Yukos Trial Raises New Questions, BBC
NEWS, June 1, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4598239.stm (discussing the
original conviction of the two men).
117. FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2004, supra note 95.
118. Id. Laura Belin observed the following:
NTV’s nationwide reach and its role in breaking the state monopoly on television
news [made] its rise and fall especially significant. NTV once represented the
end of the state’s ability to control the media agenda. Now it is a reminder that
the Kremlin retains leverage over Russian media, thanks to the media’s financial
dependence on corporations that are themselves dependent on the state.
Laura Belin, The Rise and Fall of Russia’s NTV, 38 STAN. J. INT’L L. 19, 42 (2002).
119. News Alert, Comm. to Protect Journalists, CPJ testifies at U.S. Helsinki Commission Hearing on Press Freedom in the Former Soviet Bloc (Aug. 2, 2007), http://
www.cpj.org/news/2007/europe/russia02aug07na.html. According to CPJ, Russia “is the
third deadliest country in the world for journalists over the past 15 years . . . behind only
the two war-riven nations of Iraq and Algeria.” Freedom of the Media in the OSCE Region:
Hearing Before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Aug. 2, 2007) (statement
of Nina Ognianova, Europe and Central Asia Program Coordinator, Committee to Protect
Journalists), available at http://www.cpj.org/regions_07/europe_07/testimony_russia_
internet_02aug07.html.
120. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Russia, in WORLD REPORT 2007, supra note 12, at 405, 406.
121. Id.
122. See Mendelson, supra note 19, at 3.
123. See FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2002, supra note 104; FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM IN
THE WORLD – RUSSIA (2003), available at http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?
page=22&year=2003&country=471; FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2004, supra note 95. For a
detailed explanation of the methodology used by Freedom House in compiling these
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media, opposition political parties, and independent business leaders.”124 By 2005, Russia’s freedom rating was downgraded further
to “Not Free,” due to the “virtual elimination of influential political
opposition parties . . . and the further concentration of executive
power.”125 Russia retained the rating of “Not Free” in 2007, when
Freedom House issued another downward trend arrow for “the
government’s intensified crackdown on NGOs, particularly those
receiving foreign funding.”126
III.

“YOU CANNOT HIDE AN AWL IN A SACK”: THE 2006
AMENDMENTS TO THE NGO LAW
A.

Overview

This Russian proverb rightly counsels that truth, like the sharp
point of an awl, will inevitably find its way out by piercing through
the subterfuge.127 Accordingly, it aptly describes the purpose of
this Section, which seeks to break through the NGO law’s vague
language, confusing amendment process, and poorly defined
scope, to provide a candid assessment of its implications for Russian civil society.
Remarkably, the amended Russian NGO law bears some stark
similarities to the practice of the Soviet Union with respect to NGO
regulation. As noted above, Soviet legislation enabled “government officials to utilize their arbitrary powers in combination with
legal ambiguities to restrict NGO development” through “subjecannual surveys, see Methodology, http://freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=351&
ana_page=292&year=2005 (last visited June 15, 2008).
124. FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2004, supra note 95.
125. FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD – RUSSIA (2005), available at http://
freedomhouse.org/inc/content/pubs/fiw/inc_country_detail.cfm?year=2005&country=
6818&pf. Most recently, the Russian Supreme Court ordered the Republican Party of Russia to cease operating, based on a request filed by the Federal Registration Service (FRS)
that alleged the political party violated the law on political parties and specifically failed to
have “the minimum required number of members—50,000” and the “stipulated number
of offices in the Russian regions.” Supreme Court Rules Republican Party Must Cease Functioning, INTERFAX RUSSIA, Mar. 23, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 5776984.
126. Freedom House, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD – RUSSIA (2007), available at http://
freedomhouse.org/inc/content/pubs/fiw/inc_country_detail.cfm?year=2007&country=
7258&pf. Russia continued to sink in Freedom House’s 2008 rankings, retaining “Not
Free” status with an additional downward trend arrow “for the Kremlin’s stage-managed
parliamentary election campaign, which left very little room for opposition parties to criticize the authorities or take their message to the people.” Freedom House, FREEDOM IN THE
WORLD – RUSSIA (2008), available at http://freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&
year=2008&country=7475.
.”
127. The proverb reads accordingly in the original Russian: “
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tive interpretation and strict regulation.”128 As demonstrated
below, the similarities do not end at requiring NGOs to be registered by the state, but can also be seen in regulating and monitoring NGO activities, as well as affecting all aspects of society,
including some possibly unintended elements.129 Significantly, all
of these tasks—registering, regulating, and monitoring—have
been ascribed to the same bureaucratic agency, the Federal Registration Service (FRS).130 Before assessing specific provisions of the
amended law, it is useful to describe this federal organization in
some detail.
B.

“Neither ‘Baaaaah,’ nor ‘Maaaaah’; Not Even ‘Cock-a-doodle-doo’”:
The Federal Registration Service

The proverb selected here reflects the FRS’s inability to offer
forthright and unambiguous answers to straightforward questions,131 based on the author’s interactions with senior FRS staff, as
well as the public statements made by its spokespersons. The consistent theme that emerges from this federal agency is a downplaying of the implications of the amended NGO law, as well as a sharp
disconnect between private and public assurances and public
actions.
In October 2004, a presidential decree created a consolidated
FRS within the Ministry of Justice and assigned that body responsibility to register all property, political parties, NGOs, and religious
organizations operating in Russia.132 This decree further tasked
128. Remias, supra note 29, at 18. See supra Part II.A (discussing the experience of
NGOs in the Soviet era).
129. See infra note 421 and accompanying text for the Russian Orthodox Church’s
reaction to the NGO law.
130. The FRS, or Rosregistratsiya, maintains a Web site (in Russian only) available at
http://www.rosregistr.ru/ (last visited June 15, 2008).
.”
131. The proverb reads accordingly in the original Russian: “
132. See Geraldine Fagan, Russia: Will NGO Regulations Restrict Religious Communities?,
FORUM 18 NEWS SERVICE, Nov. 14, 2006, http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=
869 (“a 13 October 2004 presidential decree created a single Federal Registration Service
within the Ministry of Justice and assigned it responsibility for registering religious (and
other) organisations, as well as monitoring the compliance of their activity with their registered charters”). Fed. Law No. 125-FZ creates a cumbersome and highly bureaucratic
registration process for religious entities, as well as a hierarchical classification system for
such entities. See generally Federal Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations, 1997, No. 125-FZ, available at http://www.legislationline.org/legislation.php?tid=2&
lid=584&less=false. Most significantly, the law divides religious associations in Russia into
religious “groups” and “organizations,” Fed. Law No. 125-FZ, art. 6(2), and requires that
the latter, in order to obtain status as a legal entity, apply for registration at either the
federal or local level. See Fed. Law No. 125-FZ, art. 11. Status as a legal entity entails the
organization to basic rights, including the right to own property. See Fed. Law No. 125-FZ,
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the FRS with monitoring the compliance of all organizations with
their respective charters.133 The new FRS bureaucracy became
operational in January 2005, and within eighteen months had a
total staff estimated at 30,000 across Russia, with 2,000 employees
working on NGO registration alone.134 The FRS has requested
that an additional 12,000 personnel be hired for 2007-08, representing a 40 percent increase in staff.135
Despite FRS assurances that it would—at least initially—not seek
to enforce the amended NGO law strictly, early FRS actions indicate a contrary intention unfolding in practice. First, the FRS
directed the registration applications submitted by a number of
U.S.-based NGOs to the FSB for “evaluation and comment”—a step
that is not provided for under the law or its implementing regulations.136 Second, rather than permit those organizations that had
submitted applications prior to the October 18, 2006 registration
deadline to continue operations until approval of their applications, the FRS instead elected to interpret the law strictly, forcing
approximately 100 groups to “suspend their principal activity
art. 21(2). Legal obstacles this law created “continued to seriously disadvantage many religious groups considered nontraditional.” BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND
LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, RUSSIA: INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 2005 (2005), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2005/51576.htm. The legal obstacles to registration presented by Fed. Law No. 125-FZ were also the focus of a recent ECHR ruling,
discussed infra Part V.C.
133. Fagan, supra note 132. In May 2006, President Putin further expanded the FRS’s
mandate, making it responsible for drawing up a biannual blacklist of literature, film, and
music that purportedly incites racial, religious, or political hatred. See First Blacklist of Literature is Released, MOSCOW TIMES, July 17, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 13553838. The first
list prepared by FRS and released in July 2007 consisted of fourteen works, including
“newspapers and brochures, as well as a book, a film, and an album.” Id. The list is available on the FRS Web site at http://www.rosregistr.ru/index.php?menu=1005000000&id=
3490, or via Google’s translation service, http://www.google.com/language_tools?hl=en
(enter the FRS list URL given supra under “Translate a web page” on the Google page).
134. Interview with FRS Senior Staff, in Moscow, Russian Federation (June 23, 2006).
135. Id. The FRS was represented by its director, Sergei Movchan (a Putin appointee),
and two senior attorneys in charge of the Directorate for Registration of Political Parties
and Public, Religious and Other Organizations, and the Directorate of Religious Organizations. Id. According to the FRS, the widely quoted estimate of 450,000 to 500,000 NGOs
operating in Russia is overstated, and many of these organizations have “essentially ceased
to exist.” Id. The FRS estimates the number of NGOs closer to 100,000 based on information from Russia’s Tax Authority. Id. This estimate is mirrored by the U.S. Department of
State, which concludes that only “20-25 percent of the approximately 450,000 registered
public associations and nongovernmental, noncommercial organizations were regularly
active.” BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, RUSSIA:
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES – 2006, supra note 10, § 3.
136. Remarks at Freedom House Roundtable: NGO Law Registration Process for Foreign NGOs in Russia (Oct. 3, 2006) (notes on file with author).
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aimed at fulfilling their objectives and tasks.”137 This ban on activities meant that, after October 18, unregistered organizations were
forced to cease any operations beyond skeletal administrative work
until the FRS approved their registration.138
Finally, the FRS has harassed a number of organizations, denied
registration on tenuous grounds, and pressed many organizations
to modify their activities. For example, the Institute for War and
Peace Reporting (IWPR)—a British Foreign Office–funded NGO
that reports on developments in the North Caucasus through a
local branch in Vladikavkaz—has been denied registration and
recently had its offices subjected to a MVD (Internal Affairs Ministry) search.139 During the search, the police confiscated computers
and documentation in connection with a charge of tax evasion.140
According to Valery Dzutsev, IWPR’s coordinator in the North
Caucasus, the “problems with the authorities began a month after
the NGO law went into effect.”141
This brief outline of the FRS’s virtually omnipresent role in Russia cannot be complete without a final footnote. In April 2007,
officers from Russia’s Interior Ministry raided FRS headquarters
and reportedly detained the head of the agency’s real estate registration division on suspicion of attempting to extort over $250,000
to process an individual’s paperwork.142 More arrests were
expected to follow as this Article went to print, and the Justice Ministry promised to undertake an investigation into how “registration
officials artificially create bureaucratic backlogs that force people
to wait months to have documents processed only to have them
137. Igor Romanov, Victims of the Register: Justice Ministry Starts Pursuing NGOs Working
Illicitly on the Side, NEZAVISIMAIA GAZETA, Oct. 19, 2006, at 4.
138. Id.; see also Associated Press, Amnesty, Human Rights Watch Allowed to Resume Work in
Russia, INT’L. HER. TRIB., Nov. 10, 2006; Yuri Mamchur, NGO Registration in Russia: Crackdown or Incompetence?, RUSSIA BLOG, Oct. 21, 2006, http://www.russiablog.org/2006/10/
ngo_registration_in_russia_cra.php.
139. See Russian Police Search UK-Funded NGO in North Caucasus, BBC MONITORING
WORLD MEDIA, Feb. 26, 2007. Additional cases of registration denial are discussed in
greater detail in infra Part IV.C.2.
140. See id.
141. Nabi Abdullaev, NGO Raided in Vladikavkaz, MOSCOW TIMES, Feb. 22, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 3425189.
142. Id. It is worth noting that corruption is not new in the Russian Federation. Russia
has ranked consistently in the bottom tier of Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, most recently landing the 147th spot out of 180 countries surveyed in 2008
(just ahead of Laos, Azerbaijan, and Zimbabwe). See TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2008 (2008), http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/
surveys_indices/cpi/2008.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1016367

2008]

Eleven Russian Proverbs

27

returned under various pretenses.”143 As will be outlined below,
this pattern is but one of the many problems now confronting
NGOs, and—despite the Justice Ministry’s assurances to the contrary—there is nothing artificial about the bureaucracy.
C.

A Brief Note on Russian Terminology and the
NGO Law Amendment Process

The NGO law introduces a complex—yet often artificial and
inconsistent—distinction between the “affiliate” or “representative”
offices of foreign NGOs, which are not considered Russian legal
entities, and the branches of foreign NGOs, which are deemed
Russian legal entities.144 This distinction generates differences in
how these organizations operate and are treated under Russian
law. For example, “affiliate” and “representative” offices of a foreign NGO are not required to register, because they have no status
as Russian legal entities.145 Rather, they are required to undergo a
“notification” process,146 which is similar in many ways to the registration procedure, but technically remains a different process. In
contrast, “branch” offices of a foreign NGO are required to register
according to the NGO law.147 Although the law makes a further
distinction between removal from the register in the case of “affiliate” or “representative” offices and liquidation in the case of
“branch” offices of foreign NGOs (and all other domestic Russian
NGOs),148 the end result for all organizations that run afoul of the
law is the same. That is, the NGO is no longer able to operate
143. Federal Registration Service Is Raided over Bribes, MOSCOW TIMES, Apr. 27, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 7928865. Ultimately, a July 14, 2008 presidential decree abolished the
FRS and reverted its responsibilities back to the Ministry of Justice. Geraldine Fagan, Were
Religious Organisations Wrongly De-registered?, FORUM 18, Sept. 10, 2008, http://www.forum
18.org/Archive.php?article_id=1185. According to Fagan, “There’s no reason to think that
it isn’t business as usual without the FRS.” Interview with Geraldine Fagan, Sept. 18, 2008
(notes on file with author). The presidential decree dissolving the FRS is available in Russian here: http://www.consultant.ru/online/base/?req=doc;base=law;n=78292.
144. Federal Law on Nonprofit Organizations, 1996, No. 7-FZ, art. 5, available at http:/
/www.usig.org/countryinfo/russia.asp (scroll down to “Applicable Laws”), amended by Federal Law on Introducing Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation, 2006, No. 18-FZ, art. 3, available at http://www.usig.org/countryinfo/russia.asp (scroll
down to “Applicable Laws”); ICNL, ANALYSIS OF LAW # 18-FZ ON INTRODUCING AMENDMENTS TO CERTAIN LEGISLATIVE ACTS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 4, 18-22 (2006) (discussing legal entity status).
145. See Fed. Law No. 7-FZ.
146. See Federal Law on Introducing Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the
Russian Federation, 2006, No. 18-FZ, art. 3, available at http://www.usig.org/countryinfo/
russia.asp (scroll down to “Applicable Laws”) (adding new art. 13.2 to Fed. Law. No. 7-FZ).
147. See Fed. Law No. 7-FZ.
148. See id.
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legally on the territory of the Russian Federation and must again
go through the entire registration or notification procedure to requalify.149 Although a key feature of the NGO law, these distinctions are minimized in the following analysis to enable a sharper
focus on the law’s overarching detrimental effects for Russian civil
society as a whole.
Similarly, the process by which the Duma amended the NGO law
is also complex, and it is made more unwieldy by virtue of the fact
that no consolidated version of the law has been published to date.
Federal Law No. 18 on Introducing Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation amends no fewer than six Russian laws, as well as the Civil Code of the Russian Federation.150
The bulk of the amendments introduced by Law No. 18, however,
affect Federal Law No. 7-FZ on Nonprofit Organizations and Law
No. 82-FZ on Public Associations.151 Although the public associations law is equally relevant for determining the status and operation of NGOs broadly defined, given the overlaps between the two
laws, an analysis restricted to the NGO law will capture the most
significant implications of the January 2006 amendments. Therefore, for the purposes of clarity and efficiency, only the provisions
of the amended NGO law (Fed. Law No. 7-FZ) are considered
below.
D. Key Provisions of the Amended NGO Law
1. The Registration Process: Filing an Application to Register
an NGO
Articles 13.1 and 13.2, introduced by the January 2006 amendments, set out the requirements for registering new domestic
NGOs and affiliate or representative offices of a foreign NGO
under Russian law.152 Under these provisions, all new domestic
NGOs, as well as existing foreign NGOs operating in Russia, are
required to register with the FRS.153 According to regulations
promulgated by the Ministry of Justice, existing foreign NGOs
operating in Russia were given until October 18, 2006, to register
successfully with the FRS.154 Failure to register by this deadline
149. See id.
150. See Federal Law No. 18-FZ.
151. See id. arts. 2, 3 (containing, respectively, the amendments to Fed. Law. No. 82-FZ
and Fed. Law. No. 7-FZ).
152. See id. art. 3.
153. Id.
154. Id. art. 6(5) (“Within six months upon the enactment of this Federal Law, foreign
non-profit non-government organizations’ structural subdivisions – branches and repre-
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automatically suspended the organization’s ability to operate
legally until the FRS approved the registration application.155
To begin the registration process, an organization must submit
to the FRS an application form, as well as various supporting documents, including
(a) “three copies of the . . . [NGO’s] constituent documents”;
(b) “two copies of the resolution . . . [establishing the NGO and
indicating] the composition of . . . governing bodies”;
(c) “two copies of . . . [forms containing detailed information on
the NGO’s] founders”; and,
(d) an “excerpt from the register of foreign legal entities from
the respective country of origin and the equivalent legal document certifying the legal status of the founder— . . . [i.e. the]
foreign organization,” where applicable.156

Establishing an “affiliate” or a “representative office” of a foreign
NGO “on the territory of the Russian Federation” requires submitting various additional supporting materials, including
(a) “constituent documents of the foreign” NGO;
(b) “resolution from the foreign . . . [NGO’s] governing body
regarding . . . [the establishment of an ‘affiliate’] or ‘representative office’ in Russia”;
(c) “statute of . . . [the ‘affiliate’] or ‘representative office,’ and;
(d) “decision on appointing . . . [the head of an ‘affiliate’] or
‘representative office’”; and,
(e) “a document specifying the goals and objectives of a foreign
. . . [NGO’s] . . . [‘affiliate’] or ‘representative office.’”157

Any subsequent amendment to an NGO’s constituent documents requires that the organization undergo the entire registration procedure again, with the requisite deadlines, timeframes, and
fees.158 It should be noted that under Soviet legislation, any
“[e]xpansion of [NGO] activities” similarly required reregistration
of the organization in question.159
sentative offices – shall notify about setting up a foreign non-profit non-government organization’s branches or representative offices on the territory of the Russian Federation.”).
155. Id.
156. Federal Law on Nonprofit Organizations, 1996, No. 7-FZ, art. 13.1(5), available at
http://www.legislationline.org/legislation.php?tid=2&lid=644&less=false, amended by Federal Law on Introducing Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation, 2006, No. 18-FZ, art. 3, available at http://www.usig.org/countryinfo/russia.asp (scroll
down to “Applicable Laws”).
157. Id. art. 13.2(2)-(3).
158. Id. art. 23(1).
159. Remias, supra note 29, at 19.
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Denial of NGO Registration

The distinction the application process makes between foreign
and domestic NGOs carries over to other areas of regulation. Most
notably, there are a number of grounds for denying registration
that apply only to “affiliate” or “representative” offices of a foreign
NGO. Of particular concern, under Article 13.2(7)(4) a foreign
NGO may be denied entry into the register where the FRS deems
its “goals . . . create a threat to the sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity, national unity, unique character, cultural heritage and national interests of the Russian Federation.”160
When the FRS denies a registration request, it is required under
the law to notify the applicant “in writing not later than a month as
of the day of receipt of the submitted documentation.”161 This
notification must provide “specific references . . .to the provisions
of the Constitution and the legislation of the Russian Federation”
that justify the denial.162 In sharp contrast to this detailed notification provision, where the FRS invokes Article 13.2(7)(4) as the
basis for its denial of registration, the NGO law requires only that
the applicant be “informed about the reason for the said denial,”
without specifying any need for justification based in law or written
notice.163
Finally, the NGO law also provides a general clause for rejecting
registration, applicable to all NGOs, which stipulates that the FRS
may deny registration where “the documentation required . . . has
not been submitted in full, or the said documents have not been
executed in a procedurally valid manner, or have been submitted
to a wrong body of power.”164
As will be discussed below, this type of provision can enable FRS
to deny registration applications on account of something as trivial
as a spelling mistake or other technical error.165
3.

Restrictions on the Right to Establish an NGO

The NGO law expressly forbids certain legal persons from
becoming founders of an NGO, including
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Fed. Law No. 7-FZ, art. 13.2(7)(4); see also id. art. 23.1(2)(2).
Id. art. 23.1(3).
Id.
Id. arts. 13.2(8), 23.1(4).
Id. art. 23.1(1)(4).
See infra Part IV.C.2.
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(1) “[A] foreign national or a stateless person” living in Russia
and deemed as “undesirable” under the law;166
(2) “[A] public association or a religious organization whose
activities have been . . . [suspended] in compliance with Article
10 of Federal Law . . . [No.] 114-FZ On Countering Extremist
Activities” (2002),167 on the grounds that the organization exercised “extremist activity that involved the violation of the rights
and freedoms of man and citizen, the infliction of damage to
the personality and health of individuals, the environment, public order, public security, the property and the lawful economic
interests of natural and/or juridical persons, the society and the
State [or] that [it] poses a real threat of inflicting such damage;”168 and,
(3) “[A] person whose actions were recognized as bearing signs
of extremist activities by the decision of a court of law, which has
come into effect.”169

As will be discussed below, several terms included in this provision lack proper definition under Russian law and may be subject
to abuse on the part of Russian authorities.170
4.

Grounds for NGO Liquidation: Russian Law, Reporting
Requirements, Inconsistent Activities, and Failure to
Comply with FRS Orders

The amended NGO law provides that a nonprofit organization
“may be liquidated on the basis and in the procedure stipulated by
the Civil Code of the Russian Federation, the present Federal Law
and any other federal laws.”171 Article 18(2.1) expands this general
basis for liquidation, whereby a branch of a foreign NGO on the
territory of the Russian Federation may be liquidated for several
additional reasons, including
(1) Failure to submit required information, in certain instances on
a quarterly basis, concerning:172
• the “volume of financial and other resources obtained by
. . . structural” subdivisions of foreign NGOs;173
166. Federal Law on Nonprofit Organisations, 1996, No. 7-FZ, art. 15(1.2)(1), available
at http://www.usig.org/countryinfo/russia.asp (scroll down to “Applicable Laws”),
amended by Federal Law on Introducing Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the
Russian Federation, 2006, No. 18-FZ, art. 3, available at http://www.usig.org/countryinfo/
russia.asp (scroll down to “Applicable Laws”).
167. Fed. Law No. 7-FZ, art. 15(1.2)(3).
168. Federal Law on the Counteraction of Extremist Activities, 2002, No. 114-FZ, art.
10, available at http://www.legislationline.org/legislation.php?tid=46&lid=634&less=false.
169. Fed. Law No. 7-FZ, art. 15(1.2)(4).
170. See infra Part IV.D.
171. Fed. Law No. 7-FZ, art. 18(1).
172. See id. arts. 18(2.1)(2), 32(4).
173. Id. art. 32(4).
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• the proposed “allocation” of such resources;174
• “the purposes” for which said resources will be expended
or used;175
• “the actual expenditure” of said resources;176
• the programs to be “implement[ed] on the territory of the
Russian Federation;”177 and,
• the use of cash assets and other property allocated to
“physical” and juridical persons.178
(2) Undertaking activities that are deemed by the FRS to be
“inconsistent with declared statutory goals” or with reported
information.179

In addition to the liquidation guidelines set forth in Article 18,
the amended NGO law expands FRS powers considerably under
Article 32. According to Article 32(8), the FRS may exclude from
the register any “affiliate” or “representative” office of a foreign
NGO when that organization fails “to submit in a timely manner”
all of the reporting information required by the FRS under the
NGO law.180 Further, under Article 32(9), the FRS can exclude a
foreign NGO from the register when it determines that the NGO
has acted outside of its mandate or contrary to other information
reported to the FRS.181 According to the legislation, both of these
FRS actions can be taken without any court procedures. In contrast, Article 32(10) provides that “a repeated failure” on the part
of a domestic NGO timely to submit required information to the
FRS provides “grounds for a court claim . . . requesting liquidation”
of the NGO in question.182 Finally, the NGO law also allows the
FRS to exclude from the register any foreign NGO that fails to “terminate its activities in connection with the implementation” of a
pending program that the FRS has banned by written order.183
This provision further stipulates that such action may result in liquidation of the organization in question but does not specify
whether a court order would be required.184
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
detail).
184.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

art. 18(2.1)(3).
art. 32(8).
art. 32(9).
art. 32(10).
art. 32(12). See also infra Part IV.F.3. (addressing this provision in greater

Fed. Law No. 7-FZ, art. 32(12).
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Government Control over NGO Activities

Article 32 of the NGO law grants the FRS extensive powers, in
addition to its oversight of the registration process, to monitor and
investigate the activities of NGOs and further to initiate liquidation
proceedings for failure to comply with the law. Originally, FRS
officials insisted that Article 32 of the NGO law “definitely applies
to religious organizations,” in addition to other NGOs.185 Of particular interest, Article 32 empowers the FRS to
(1) Request “documents containing resolutions by . . . [the
NGO’s] governing bodies”;
(2) Request and “obtain information regarding . . . [the NGO’s
financial] and economic activities from state statistical . . . [and
revenue agencies,] other agencies of government control and
supervision, and . . . financial institutions”;
(3) “[S]end . . . its representatives to participate in events held
by” the NGO; and,
(4) Review “compliance of . . . [the NGO’s] activities, including
its financial expenditures and property management, with its
statutory goals” up to once a year.186

As noted above, Article 32 grants the FRS further powers with
respect to foreign NGOs. Under Section 12, the FRS, by way of a
written decision, can ban a foreign NGO from “implementing a
pending program . . . on the territory of the Russian Federation.”187 Failure to comply with such a directive “may entail an
exclusion of [the foreign NGO’s] branch or representative office
from the register and liquidation of the said structural unit”188 A
similar provision in Article 32(13) enables the FRS
For the purposes of protecting the basis of the Constitutional
system, morality, health, rights and lawful interests of other persons, and with the aim of defending the country and state security . . . to issue a substantiated written decision banning a
transfer by a foreign non-profit [NGO’s] structural unit of monetary and other resources to certain recipients of the said
resources and other properties.189

185. Interview with FRS Senior Staff, supra note 134. At the time this statement was
made, it represented a dramatic development, because all other Russian officials had
insisted that the NGO law bore no implications whatsoever for religious groups. For an
update on the application of this provision to religious organizations, see infra Part VI.B.1.
186. Fed. Law No. 7-FZ, art. 32(4).
187. Id. art. 32(12).
188. Id. art. 32(12).
189. Id. art. 32(13).
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“LAW IS LIKE THE SHAFT OF A CART, IT POINTS
WHEREVER YOU TURN IT”: AN ANALYSIS
OF THE AMENDED NGO LAW
A.

Overview

Much of the early discussion surrounding the amended NGO
law revolved around the premise that what was written down on
paper was not necessarily what would be implemented in practice.
Consequently, some observers preferred to take a wait-and-see attitude with respect to the law, stressing that implementation—rather
than content—was key. In Russian tradition, there is a perception
that the law is a powerful tool that can be manipulated to the
advantage of those who are able to control it, whether they be powerful, wealthy, or otherwise connected.190 In this respect, the NGO
law is no different. As the following analysis demonstrates, the law
is replete with undefined powers, as well as vague, discriminatory,
and overbroad provisions that—in the hands of the powerful—are
ready to be and already are being pointed in the desired direction.
B.

Implementation of Registration Process

The practical aspects of the registration process as conducted to
date, particularly with respect to foreign organizations operating in
Russia, appear to run contrary to assurances made by the FRS. FRS
director Sergei Movchan insisted that the new registration requirements for NGOs would not require professional lawyers, “since
organizations already have filled out the forms.”191 In addition,
Alexei Jafarov, director of the FRS’s registration department, reasoned that the new registration regulations “will leave little discretion to officials.”192 Yet, during the registration application
190. The proverb reads accordingly in the original Russian: “
.” Jeffrey Kahn also cites this proverb in his informative paper
on rule of law in Russia. Kahn, supra note 115, at 357.
191. Interview with FRS Senior Staff, supra note 134.
192. Interview with Alexei Jafarov, Dir., FRS Directorate for Registration of Political
Parties and Pub., Religious, and Other Orgs., in Wash., DC (July 27, 2006). The ICNL has
noted that well-drafted regulations underpinning the NGO law:
could have [limited] the potential harmfulness of the Law by setting forth the
forms and accordant definitions and requirements for NGOs in a manner which
responds to and ameliorates the concerns previously identified . . . however, the
regulations have confirmed our initial concerns as to the restrictive nature of the
Law.
ICNL, ANALYSIS OF THE DECREE NO. 212 APPROVED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION “ON MEASURES AIMED AT IMPLEMENTING CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE FEDERAL
LAWS REGULATING ACTIVITIES OF NON-COMMERCIAL ORGANIZATIONS” 2 (2006) [hereinafter
ANALYSIS OF DECREE NO. 212].
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process, many organizations found it necessary to seek legal counsel, in addition to translation and notary services. In the view of at
least one NGO official, the registration process was “by no means
an easy task,” requiring “a very meticulous effort,” the hiring of a
local consultant, and many hours of legal counsel.193 According to
other observers, different FRS officials gave NGOs conflicting
information concerning what supporting documents NGOs must
submit and what they should write in the registration application
itself, thus introducing a clear element of discretion in the FRS’s
approach.194
The typical NGO registration form is approximately fifty pages,
with additional supporting documentation and other forms
required on a case-by-case basis that may total hundreds of
pages.195 In practice, FRS forms require organizations to collect
and notarize information ranging from passport data to “home
addresses for founding members,” and they further require NGOs
to amend their charters to authorize explicitly the opening of an
office in Russia.196 Other NGOs report their having to submit copies of “all press coverage of their activities” and notarized death
certificates of founders dating back to 1919.197
The registration process also mandates that foreign NGOs operating in Russia have all application materials “translated into Russian and duly certified,”198 which at first glance appears to be a
reasonable request. The FRS, however, declined a number of
registration applications on the basis of poor translations,199 forc193. Remarks at Freedom House Roundtable, supra note 136. This NGO official also
noted that the Moscow office of the U.S. Agency for International Development was of
“limited value and assistance” in completing the registration process. Id.
194. For an example of how these mixed messages operate in practice to harm the
interests of civil society, see the case of the Stichting Russian Justice Initiative (SRJI), discussed infra Part IV.C.2.
195. Chloe Arnold, Russia: NGOs Uneasy as Deadline Passes, RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO
LIBERTY, Apr. 19, 2007, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2007/04/26b408f6-b1974626-a7ce-81bb641368e8.html.
196. Claire Bigg, Foreign NGOs Rush to Beat Registration Deadline, RADIO FREE EUROPE/
RADIO LIBERTY, Oct. 16, 2006, http://www.globalpolicy.org/ngos/state/2006/1016
regdeadline.htm.
197. Kaban, supra note 19.
198. Federal Law on Nonprofit Organizations, 1996, No. 7-FZ, art. 13.2(4), available at
http://www.usig.org/countryinfo/russia.asp (scroll down to “Applicable Laws”), amended
by Federal Law on Introducing Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian
Federation, 2006, No. 18-FZ, art. 3, available at http://www.usig.org/countryinfo/russia.asp
(scroll down to “Applicable Laws”).
199. Alexei Jafarov, Dir., FRS Directorate for Registration of Political Parties and Pub.,
Religious, and Other Orgs., Press Conference (Aug. 18, 2006) (transcript on file with
author).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1016367

36

The Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev.

[Vol. 40

ing organizations to pay for the re-translation of materials until
FRS staff was duly satisfied. The fact that at least one FRS official
claimed that many applications had been rejected because of
“repulsive” translations further underscores the existence of subjective decision-making within the registration process, despite assurances from senior FRS staff to the contrary.200 Disturbingly,
Movchan himself publicly decried as “shoddy” the translated documents submitted by NGOs and insinuated that the alleged poor
quality testified to a lack of respect toward the Russian state on the
part of NGOs.201
Under the law, a decision to register an NGO “shall be rendered
[by the FRS] on the basis of the documents submitted in compliance
with [Article 13.1(5)].”202 Yet, reports indicated that the FRS forwarded registration applications submitted by several prominent
U.S. organizations operating branch offices in Russia to the FSB for
comment.203 The ability to take this additional step—one nowhere
spelled out in the law—again points to the extensive discretion
afforded to the FRS, even when operating outside the parameters
of the NGO law.
According to Movchan, the FRS would not be “very strict” about
enforcement at the beginning of the process, because it was “all
very new.”204 Yet, in addition to rejecting applications based on
poor translations, the FRS also sought to enforce the NGO law
The procedure itself, the procedure of analysis of documents, is not too complex,
but it requires accuracy, because the main faults in the preparation of the documents concern either low quality translation or contradictions in documents as a
result of certain mistakes, misprints, contradictory data, or packages may be
incomplete.
In fact, our refusal to enter an organization into the register may be based on
three main elements: incomplete package of documents, knowingly false information presented in documents or documents containing provisions that are at odds
with existing legislation of the Russian Federation.
Id; see also Russia Stops Aid Groups’ Work, CNN, Oct. 19, 2006, http://edition.cnn.com/
2006/WORLD/europe/10/19/russia.ngos.ap/ (“One group’s founding charter was in
Russian, but officials insisted on it being translated back into English in the organization’s
home country and then translated back into Russian and notarized. ‘They are certainly
using every means they can to find minor, absurd aspects of the applications to refuse
documents, and that amounts to deliberate obstructionism,’ said a Western NGO activist
who spoke on condition of anonymity to avoid jeopardizing the registration process.”).
200. Foreign NGOs Near Deadline, MOSCOW TIMES, Sept. 20, 2006, 2006 WLNR 16267201.
(quoting Anatoly Panchenko, deputy director of the FRS’s NGO department).
201. Romanov, supra note 137.
202. Fed. Law No. 7-FZ, art. 13.1(6) (emphasis added).
203. Remarks at Freedom House Roundtable, supra note 136.
204. Interview with FRS Senior Staff, supra note 134. This seemingly contradicted
Movchans’s previous statement that NGOs already were familiar with the process. See supra
text accompanying note 191.
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strictly by forbidding those organizations whose pending applications had not been processed by the registration deadline—including Doctors Without Borders, Amnesty International, the National
Democratic Institute for International Affairs, and the International Republican Institute—from operating legally.205 As one Russian Justice Ministry official stated, these “NGOs will not cease to
exist after October 18 . . . they will be simply unable to function.”206
C.
1.

Grounds for Denial of NGO Registration

Grounds for Denying Registration of a Foreign NGO

The provisions for denying the registration of an NGO differ
depending on whether that organization is registering as a foreign
rather than a Russian NGO. The criteria for denial of registration
of a foreign NGO are vague, overly broad, and can be invoked by
the FRS with substantial discretion. According to high-level FRS
officials, denial of NGO registration applications is based on what
the FRS determines amounts to goals that threaten “the sovereignty,
political independence, territorial integrity, national unity, unique
character, cultural heritage and national interests of the Russian
Federation.”207 There are no objective legal definitions, additional
explanatory notes, or guidelines in the regulations accompanying
the law that provide any guidance as to the precise scope or meaning of these criteria. For example, no regulations expand upon the
legal meaning of a “threat” to Russia’s “cultural heritage” or
“unique character” or, for that matter, precisely what constitutes
Russia’s heritage or character. Furthermore, the FRS confirmed
that neither it nor the Ministry of Justice had plans to draft regulations clarifying these terms.208 In other words, this provision may
serve as a catchall clause under which the FRS may scrutinize and
205. C. J. Chivers, Kremlin Puts Foreign NGO’s on Notice, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2006, http:/
/www.nytimes.com/2006/10/20/world/europe/20russia.html. As of this writing, these
organizations have been successfully entered into the register.
206. Yablokova, supra note 21. According to an FRS directive, “termination of activity”
requires an unregistered NGO to cease “implementation of purposes and goals of an
organization directly, as well as through funding of activities of Russian organizations, and
shall not apply to its obligations as an employer, and economic obligations.” FRS, ON
PROCEDURE OF ESTABLISHING AN AFFILIATE OR A REPRESENTATIVE OFFICE OF AN INTERNATIONAL OR FOREIGN NON-COMMERCIAL NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION ON THE TERRITORY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 2 (2006) (ICNL trans.) (on file with author).
207. Fed. Law No. 7-FZ, arts. 13.2(7)(4), 23.1(2)(2).
208. Interview with FRS Senior Staff, supra note 134. The FRS intends to use any court
rulings that arise based on NGO challenges to denial of registration as further guidance
for refining its internal determinations. Id.
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deem unfit the goals and objectives of any foreign NGO seeking
registration, if so desired by Russian government officials.
The FRS has provided mixed messages concerning the enforceability of this clause. One official stated that “as a practitioner of
law [he] would not know how to enforce this provision.”209 He
further ventured that this clause would “only be used against wellknown threats such as al-Qaeda,” and that the courts would have to
sort out any “overstep” on the part of the FRS.210 During another
media interview, however, the same official reasoned that this provision in its entirety could and would be enforced “to deny an entry
into the register to organizations whose activities foment ethnic
strife or undermine the sovereignty of Russia.”211 In the event that
the FRS elects to invoke this article in rejecting an application for
registration, it remains free to do so without providing written reasons grounded in law and without clarifying guidelines or regulations—again underscoring the substantial discretion that is woven
into the enforcement provisions of this law. As noted above, it is
particularly troubling that, under Article 13.2(8) of the legislation,
the obligation to provide written reasons is explicitly waived in
instances where the vaguest grounds for denial of registration may
be invoked.212
Given the operation of these two provisions together, the law
raises serious due process concerns for foreign NGOs with respect
to the application procedure. In light of these provisions, a situation may emerge whereby the FRS rejects repeated attempts to register without referencing any Russian law, or alternatively the FRS
may obstruct registration applications with endless requests for
additional information.213 It should be stressed that although the
NGO law does extend the right of a court appeal to NGOs that
have been denied registration, the NGO will be forbidden from
operating legally in Russia during the interim period and, moreover, will be faced with the significant burden of costs associated
with a court proceeding if it elects to appeal the FRS’s decision.214
Likewise, although the NGO law provides organizations that have
been denied registration the right to resubmit an application, an
FRS denial on the basis of Article 13.2(8) means that an NGO’s
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
OF LAW
214.

Interview with Alexei Jafarov, supra note 192.
Id.
Press Conference with Alexei Jafarov, supra note 199.
See supra Part III.D.2.
This threat has been noted elsewhere, including by the ICNL. See ICNL, ANALYSIS
# 18-FZ, supra note 144.
Fed. Law No. 7-FZ, arts. 13.2(9), 23.1(5).
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reapplication may occur without any specific guidance on what
changes may be required to satisfy the FRS. Therefore, this route
appears no more attractive an option for securing registration and,
in fact, may draw NGOs resubmitting a registration request into an
endless loop of applications denied without a clear basis grounded
in law. Indeed, there is already mounting evidence that the FRS
can and will deny registration applications on multiple occasions
based on different grounds.215
2.

Grounds for Denying Registration of Any NGO

FRS officials need not rely on the catchall clause of Article
13.2(7)(4) alone to deny registration to a foreign NGO. The law
also provides that the FRS can deny registration to all NGOs—
domestic and foreign alike—when it determines that “the documentation, required for the state registration . . . has not been submitted in full, or . . . [has] not been executed in a procedurally
valid manner,”216 or if it “establishe[s] that the constituent documents submitted by a foreign . . . [NGO] contain unreliable
information.”217
The FRS has already used this position against a number of
NGOs seeking registration. Perhaps most egregiously, the case of
the Stichting Russian Justice Initiative (SRJI) is indicative of the
arbitrary and discretionary nature of Article 23.1(1)(4) of the NGO
law, as well as the potential application of the law to stifle critics of
Russian government policy. The SRJI, an NGO registered in the
Netherlands “that since 2001 has provided legal assistance to victims of grave human rights abuse in the North Caucasus,” currently
represents clients in more than one hundred cases before the
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR or Court).218 Many of
these cases deal with human rights abuses in Chechnya and adjacent areas.219 In 2006, the ECHR issued no less than four rulings
in favor of applicants represented by SRJI,220 and the Russian gov215. See, e.g., infra Part IV.C.2 (discussing the case of the SRJI) and infra Part VI.A
(discussing the case of the political party Great Russia).
216. Federal Law on Nonprofit Organizations, 1996, No. 7-FZ, art. 23.1(1)(4), available
at http://www.usig.org/countryinfo/russia.asp (scroll down to “Applicable Laws”),
amended by Federal Law on Introducing Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the
Russian Federation, 2006, No. 18-FZ, art. 3, available at http://www.usig.org/countryinfo/
russia.asp (scroll down to “Applicable Laws”).
217. Id. art. 13.2(7)(2).
218. Press Release, SRJI, Russian Government Rejects Registration of Russian Justice
Initiative (Nov. 23, 2006), available at http://www.srji.org/en/news/2006/11/23/.
219. Id.
220. Id.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1016367

40

The Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev.

[Vol. 40

ernment agreed to pay compensation in some of these cases. The
FRS rejected SRJI’s registration applications twice before finally
agreeing to register the organization.221
Despite having closely consulted with FRS officials over several
months and preparing “all the documents in accordance with their
instructions,” the SRJI received its first denial of registration notice
from the FRS in November 2006.222 The rejection letter cited the
following grounds: first, SRJI did not properly sign its application;
second, the organization’s executive director did not have proper
authority to represent the organization; and finally, the registration
application contained inconsistencies.223 According to SRJI, during an October 2006 meeting with the FRS, officials “had indicated
that submission of [a single signature] would be sufficient” to complete the application and that an additional document empowering the executive director to represent the organization “would be
superfluous.”224 The inconsistency in SRJI’s application stemmed
from a reference to its representative office “in the city of Moscow,”
rather than what current guidelines require—that is, “in the Russian Federation.”225
Following the initial denial of its request, SRJI amended its application and reapplied, only to be denied again by the FRS, this time
on the grounds of an “entirely new problem.”226 On January 19,
2007, the FRS denied SRJI’s second application, reasoning that
SRJI should have sought registration as a “branch office” rather
than a “representative office,” because its goals and objectives were
not compatible with the latter, and also based on a number of
other technical “errors.”227 Coincidentally, this rejection followed
on the heels of Chitayev & Chitayev v. Russia, an ECHR ruling
221. Press Release, SRJI, Russian Government Registers Russian Justice Initiative (Feb.
27. 2007), available at http://www.srji.org/en/news/2007/02/27/.
222. Press Release, SRJI, supra note 218.
223. Id. These are not new tactics. In the wake of the original passage of the NGO law,
the Union of Kuzbass Youth, a local NGO, was reportedly denied registration based on the
formatting of its application. Grishina et al., supra note 71, § 2. The Ministry of Justice
commented that the font was too small, and there were too many papers. Id.
224. Press Release, SRJI, supra note 218.
225. Id.
226. Telephone Interview with Ole Solvang, Executive Dir., SRJI, in Wash., D.C. (Jul.
25, 2007).
227. Press Release, SRJI, Russian Government Rejects Registration of Russian Justice
Initiative for Second Time (Jan. 25, 2007), available at http://www.srji.org/en/news/2007/
01/26/. The FRS corroborated at least the first reason given for denying the SRJI’s second
application. See Russian Govt: No Politics Behind Decision on Dutch Group, INTERFAX, Jan. 25,
2007, available at 1/25/07 WRLDNWSC 18:35:18 (Westlaw). For a discussion of the differences between “branch” and “representative” offices, see supra Part III.C.
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issued in favor of two Chechen brothers who alleged, inter alia, violations of Articles 3 and 5 of the European Convention pertaining
to the right to liberty and security as well as the prohibition of torture.228 Significantly, SRJI represented the applicants in this
landmark case229—the first successful petition against Russian officials since the Chechnyan conflict began in 1994.
In the face of mounting international and press scrutiny of
SRJI’s situation, the FRS retorted that it was “inappropriate to
make a tragedy our [sic] of the fact that this organization has been
unable to receive re-registration on two occasions. Moreover, it is
wrong to say that there are any political motives” underpinning the
FRS’s decisions in the case.230 Ultimately, FRS approved SRJI’s
third application to register on February 20, 2007, four months
after the organization was forced to suspend its operations.231
Disturbingly, the SRJI’s experience hints at the reality that denial
of registration may be motivated by factors other than simple technical errors in an NGO’s application package. Moreover, it is difficult to downplay the impact significant international attention may
have had in pressuring FRS authorities to approve SRJI’s application, despite obstructing their work for four months.232 In any
event, once registered, NGOs have no guarantee under the law
that they are entitled to retain this status. On the contrary, the
general and vague content of the provisions governing denial of
registration—coupled with the FRS’s free hand in interpreting and
enforcing their meaning—ultimately may facilitate the post facto
denial of registration, even after an NGO is entered into the register successfully. According to Jafarov,
If [an NGO decides] to mislead [the FRS], perhaps they will
prepare documents in such a way that we will not notice this
during our analysis of that [registration] package . . . . But they
will have to bear in mind that they are laying a delayed action
bomb, because if we find this out later, this will certainly be
228. Chitayev & Chitayev v. Russia, App. No. 59334/00, ¶¶ 137-44 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan.
18, 2007), http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int////tkp197/viewhbkm.asp?action=open&table=F6
9A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649&key=60547&sessionId=1729060&skin=hudoc-en
&attachment=true. The ECHR found violations due to the applicants’ unacknowledged
detention, allegations of ill treatment, the absence of an effective investigation, and the
absence of judicial review. Id. ¶ 219.
229. Id. ¶ 2.
230. No Politics Behind Decision on Dutch Group, supra note 227.
231. See Press Release, SRJI, supra note 221.
232. Among other steps, the Dutch Embassy in Moscow raised SRJI’s application with
the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to “make clear they were concerned with SRJI’s
case.” Telephone Interview with Ole Solvang, supra note 226.
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grounds for expulsion from the register. And this will be an obstacle to
reentry into the register for that organization.233

In other words, the FRS reserves the right to conclude at any time
that registration information provided by an NGO is either insufficient or is otherwise “unreliable” and, further, to determine
whether that omission or error stems from an NGO’s desire to
“mislead” the FRS, in which case the organization may be excluded
from the register. The FRS could base such an action on either
Article 23.1(1)(4) in the case of domestic NGOs or Article
13.2(7)(2) in the case of foreign NGOs. The ability of the FRS to
strike organizations from the register is bolstered by the requirement that an NGO repeat the entire registration process in the
event that there is any change to its constituent documents234 and,
further, by the ability to exclude foreign NGOs from the register
where the FRS concludes the organization’s activities are inconsistent with its declared goals.235 Alarmingly, Jafarov appears to insinuate here that such a “delayed action bomb” may also be grounds
for discriminating against an NGO that attempts to reapply after
being deleted from the register by the FRS, a power that does not
appear anywhere in the text of the NGO law.236
D.

Restrictions Limiting the Right to Establish
or Participate in a NGO

As noted above, the NGO law establishes specific restrictions limiting the pool of legal persons entitled to establish or participate in
an NGO. Perhaps most egregious among the limitations set forth
under Article 15(1.2) is the acknowledgement on the part of FRS
officials that no legal definition for the term “undesirable” person
exists under Russian law, nor is there any plan to draft additional
regulations to clarify the term in the NGO law.237 The International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL) has reported that certain Russian authorities retain “the right to determine that it is
‘undesirable’ for a foreign national to remain in [the Russian Federation], and these agencies have complete discretion to set their
233. Press Conference with Alexei Jafarov, supra note 199 (emphasis added).
234. See Federal Law on Nonprofit Organizations, 1996, No. 7-FZ, art. 23(1), available at
http://www.usig.org/countryinfo/russia.asp (scroll down to “Applicable Laws”), amended
by Federal Law on Introducing Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian
Federation, 2006, No. 18-FZ, art. 3, available at http://www.usig.org/countryinfo/russia.asp
(scroll down to “Applicable Laws”); see also supra Part III.D.1.
235. Fed. Law No. 7-FZ, art. 32(9).
236. Press Conference with Alexei Jafarov, supra note 199.
237. Interview with FRS Senior Staff, supra note 134.
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own rules for making that determination.”238 In this instance, the
NGO law will be enforced based on FRS interpretations of the various provisions (or the discretion of other governmental agencies),
and any modifications to this understanding will occur only in the
event that an impugned “undesirable” person successfully challenges the FRS’s interpretation and/or related actions in court.
Putting aside the vague wording of Article 15(1.2) of the NGO
law, it is crucial to note that this provision—and the entire law, for
that matter—does not operate in a vacuum. Rather, it is part of an
elaborate legislative web that has emerged in Russia to constrict the
ability of civil society—and specifically those elements perceived as
challenging the current government’s policies—to operate freely.
For example, the Sovietsky district court in the town of Nizhny
Novgorod sentenced Stanislav Dmitrievsky, the co-chair of the Russian-Chechen Friendship Society (RCFS),239 to a suspended twoyear prison term and four years’ probation for inciting ethnic
hatred under Russia’s extremism law.240 The charges against Dmitrievsky stemmed from publication of statements issued by
Chechen separatist leaders in Pravo-Zashchita (Rights Protection),
the RCFS newspaper.241 One of these statements, which Aslan
Maskhadov authored, appealed to the European Parliament to
hold Russia responsible for genocide in Chechnya.242 International human rights groups, including Amnesty International and
Human Rights First, roundly condemned the charges against Dmi238. INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR NOT-FOR-PROFIT LAW, ANALYSIS OF LAW NO. 18-FZ ON
INTRODUCING AMENDMENTS TO CERTAIN LEGISLATIVE ACTS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 3
(2006).
239. Peter Finn, Russian Court Backs Closing of Chechen Rights Group, WASH. POST, Jan. 24,
2007, at A8. Prior to its liquidation, the Russian-Chechen Friendship Society (RCFS) monitored human rights violations in Chechnya and other parts of the North Caucasus. Id.
The RCFS was “almost entirely underwritten by the European Union, the U.S. governmentfunded National Endowment for Democracy and the Norwegian Foreign Ministry.” Id.
240. See Press Release, Amnesty International, Russian Federation: Amnesty International Calls for Guilty Verdict Against Stanislav Dmitrievsky to be Overturned (Feb. 3,
2006), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/EUR46/006/2006. The
actual criminal charges derived from Article 282 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, which addresses, inter alia, incitement to hatred and participation in the activities
of extremist organizations.
241. Press Release, Amnesty International, supra note 240. Pravo-Zashchita is published jointly by RCFS and another Nizhny Novgorod-based human rights NGO. Id.
242. Carl Gershman, The Darkness Spreading over Russia, WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 2006,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/20/AR2006102001
242.html. Maskhadov was elected president of Chechnya in 1997 following settlement of
the first Chechen war. Id. He was, however, wanted by Russian authorities, who believed
he was involved in the 2004 Beslan school massacre that left 331 people dead, including
186 children. Finn, supra note 239. Russian forces killed Maskhadov in March 2005. Id.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1016367

44

The Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev.

[Vol. 40

trievsky and his subsequent trial as proceeding on illegitimate
grounds.243 According to Human Rights First, the Dmitrievsky case
confirmed the Putin government’s intent to apply “laws intended
to control religious extremism against those who work daily to prevent it through their non-violent activities.”244
Based on the inter-operation of the NGO law and the extremism
law, human rights activists such as Dmitrievsky not only find themselves under threat of government sanction, but also may have
charges against them serve as the justification for initiation of liquidation proceedings against any organizations with which they are
affiliated. Under Article 15 of the extremism law,
If the leader or a member of the governing body of a public or a
religious association or any other organisation makes a public
statement that calls for extremist activity without any reference
to the fact that this reflects his personal opinion, and likewise in
case of the entry into legal force of a court decision in respect to
this person for an offence of an extremist character, the corresponding . . . organisation shall be obliged to state in public its
disagreement with the pronouncements or actions of such person. . . . If the corresponding . . . organisation fails to make such a
public statement, this may be regarded as a fact testifying to the presence
of extremism in their activity.245

The extremism law further provides that where an NGO fails to
distance itself from “facts testifying to the presence of signs of
extremism” in its activity, that organization “shall be liquidated.”246
243. Amnesty International concluded that “the two articles published do not contain
any incitement to hatred or enmity, or any form of violence.” Press Release, Amnesty
International, supra note 240. Likewise, Human Rights Watch “found that [the statements] do not contain any language that could legitimately be prohibited under international human rights law.” Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Russia: Court Orders
Closure of Russian-Chechen Friendship Society (Oct. 13, 2006), available at http://
hrw.org/english/docs/2006/10/13/russia14391.htm; see also Alert, Amnesty International,
Human Rights Defenders in Russia Facing Threats and Intimidation (Nov. 16, 2005), available at http://www.amnesty.org.ru/pages/rus-161105-action-eng; Alert, Human Rights
First, Russian Rights Leader Faces Prosecution and Needs Your Help (Aug. 24, 2005), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/defenders/hrd_russia/alert082405_dmitrievsky.
htm.
244. HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, RUSSIA’S NEW DIRECTION: AN UPDATE TO THE NEW DISSIDENTS: HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS AND COUNTERTERRORISM IN RUSSIA 4 (2005), available at
http://www.humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/06622-hrd-russia-update-web.pdf. The RCFS situation has also captured the attention of foreign governments, including the United States.
See generally BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, RUSSIA: COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES – 2006, supra note 10 (prominently
featuring the RCFS case).
245. Federal Law on the Counteraction of Extremist Activity, 2002, No. 114-FZ, art. 15
(emphasis added), available at http://www.legislationline.org/legislation.php?tid=46&lid=
634&less=false.
246. Id. art. 7 (emphasis added).
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In tandem with this, the NGO law stipulates that an NGO “may be
liquidated on the basis and in the procedure stipulated by the Civil
Code of the Russian Federation, the present Federal Law and any
other federal laws”247 and that “a person whose actions were recognized as bearing signs of extremist activities by the decision of a
court of law” cannot be a founder, participant, or member of a nonprofit
organization.248 In other words, these laws impose a kind of vicarious liability on those NGOs that fail to condemn publicly words or
deeds imputed to their leadership and/or membership that may
be construed as falling under Russia’s ever-expanding definition of
“extremist activity.”249
By invoking this complex legal framework—and specifically Article 15 of the extremism law noted above—regional prosecutors
convinced the Nizhegorod Oblast Court in October 2006 that Dmitrievsky’s prior conviction and his relationship with the RCFS were
sufficient grounds to order the NGO closed.250 Under the extremism law, RCFS could have avoided prosecution by removing Dmitrievsky from the organization’s board and membership roll, as
well as issuing a public denunciation of his actions within five days
of his conviction.251 For obvious reasons, RCFS chose to forgo such
a move. Human Rights Watch described the court’s verdict as a
“blatant attempt to silence a strong critic of human rights abuses in
Chechnya” and an act that “fl[ies] in the face of international standards protecting civil society.”252 Amnesty International similarly
condemned the decision as “the latest move in a carefully calculated strategy to get rid of an organization that has been outspoken
on behalf of victims of human rights violations in Chechnya.”253
247. Federal Law on Nonprofit Organizations, 1996, No. 7-FZ, art. 18(1), available at
http://www.usig.org/countryinfo/russia.asp (scroll down to “Applicable Laws”), amended
by Federal Law on Introducing Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian
Federation, 2006, No. 18-FZ, art. 3, available at http://www.usig.org/countryinfo/russia.asp
(scroll down to “Applicable Laws”) (emphasis added).
248. Id. art. 15(1.2)(4).
249. The expanding legal definition of extremism in Russia is discussed in greater
detail in supra note 66.
250. See Tatyana Margolin, Russia Court Shuts Down Chechen Rights NGO on Heels of
Politkovskaya Murder, JURIST PAPER CHASE, Oct. 14, 2006, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/
paperchase/2006/10/russia-court-shuts-down-chechen-rights.php; see also Greg Sampson,
Russian Court Convicts Head of U.S.-Supported NGO for Inciting Hatred, JURIST PAPER CHASE,
Feb. 4, 2006, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2006/02/russian-court-convicts-headof-us.php (discussing the original conviction).
251. See Press Release, Human Rights Watch, supra note 243.
252. Id.
253. Press Release, Amnesty International, Russian Federation: Russian Chechen
Friendship Society Closed Under New NGO Law (Oct. 13, 2006), available at http://
www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/EUR46/048/2006.
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On January 23, 2007, the Russian Supreme Court upheld the
lower court’s ruling that shut down RCFS.254 Amnesty International proclaimed that the ruling against RCFS “sends a chilling
signal that other NGOs stepping out of line can share its fate.”255
The RCFS has been closed since October 2006, but it has been
partially reconstituted as three new organizations, including the
Nizhny Novgorod Foundation for Promoting Tolerance, the Russian-Chechen Friendship Society in Europe (registered in Finland), and another regional tolerance association registered in
Chechnya in March 2007.256 As of this writing, the organization
had filed an application to appeal to the ECHR under Article 34 of
the European Convention.257
The experience of the RCFS starkly illustrates how the NGO law
can prohibit individuals whose actions bear “signs of extremist
activity” from founding NGOs and may also function as the pretense for liquidating any NGO with which that individual is associated. Disturbingly, therefore, this incident serves as an early
indicator of how Russia’s amended NGO law—and specifically its
overbroad, discretionary, and interlocking nature—can be
manipulated to constrict the operation of Russian civil society. The
RCFS case also is a fitting transition to the following Section, which
addresses grounds for liquidating an NGO under the amended
NGO law.

254. Finn, supra note 239.
255. Press Release, Amnesty International, Supreme Court Decision Gags Civil Society
(Jan. 23, 2007), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/EUR46/004/2007.
For the RCFS’s statement issued following the Supreme Court’s decision, see Statement
from the Russian-Chechen Friendship Society Following Its Forced Closure, http://
www.frontlinedefenders.org/node/144 (last visited Aug. 17, 2007). Among other allegations, RCFS claimed authorities sought to prevent international observers from attending
the court proceedings by assigning the case to a small room and filling the room with
students from a local law school. Id.
256. FrontLine, Russian Human Rights Defenders Face On Going [sic] Harassment, http://
www.frontlinedefenders.org/node/143 (last visited Aug. 17, 2008); Press Release, Human
Rights First, Police in Nizhny Novgorod Threaten to Detain Russian Human Rights Leaders (Mar. 22, 2007), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/media/hrd/2007/alert/
244/index.htm.
257. Article 34 of the European Convention provides that the European Court of
Human Rights:
may receive applications from any person, non-governmental organisation or
group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High
Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the protocols
thereto. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to hinder in any way the
effective exercise of this right.
European Convention, supra note 13, art. 34.
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FRS Powers to Liquidate NGOs

Reporting Obligations for Domestic and Foreign NGOs

The NGO law delineates a number of specific reporting obligations imposed on domestic and foreign NGOs and also sets out the
consequences for failure to meet these reporting criteria. Expectations of timely reporting are more stringent for foreign NGOs than
for domestic ones, and failure of foreign NGOs to meet established
deadlines also leads to more severe penalties. Foreign NGOs also
are required under the law to report on their activities—both
financial and programmatic—with greater frequency and in
greater detail than domestic NGOs.
a.

Strict Deadlines for Reporting

In the case of a domestic NGO, the law requires a “repeated failure . . . to submit . . . [within an established time period required]
information” to the FRS before any liquidation action can be taken
against the organization.258 In contrast, the law implies that a foreign NGO may be removed from the register after only one “failure
to provide information” required.259 The NGO law further enables
the FRS to exclude a foreign NGO from the official Unified State
Register of Legal Entities in the event that either
(1) The NGO in question, even in a single instance, fails “to
submit in a timely manner all of the information” required by
the FRS260 or
(2) The FRS determines that an “[‘affiliate’] or representative
office [is] carrying out activities inconsistent with” its declared
goals.261

Nothing in the NGO law or its underlying regulations provides a
definition for “timely manner.” More problematic, the law authorizes the FRS to strike “affiliate” or “representative” offices of foreign NGOs from the register under Article 32(8) and (9) without
requiring a court order.262 Although there is a distinction between
exclusion from the registry and liquidation, it is worthwhile to note
258. Federal Law on Nonprofit Organizations, 1996, No. 7-FZ, art. 32(10), available at
http://www.usig.org/countryinfo/russia.asp (scroll down to “Applicable Laws”), amended
by Federal Law on Introducing Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian
Federation, 2006, No. 18-FZ, art. 3, available at http://www.usig.org/countryinfo/russia.asp
(scroll down to “Applicable Laws”). For background on the information that NGOs are
required to provide the FRS, see supra Part III.D.4.
259. See Fed. Law No. 7-FZ, art. 18(2.1)(2).
260. Id. art. 32(8).
261. Id. art. 32(9).
262. See id. art. 32(8)-(9).
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here that exclusion from the register effectively removes an NGO’s
ability to conduct activities legally, resulting in both penalties having essentially the same end result—an inability to continue operations legally in Russia.263 Even though an NGO would retain the
right to appeal such an administrative decision through the
courts,264 the FRS’s ability to remove the legal basis for an NGO’s
operations without due process may interrupt NGO activities and
could drain the organization’s financial resources by compelling it
to engage in costly litigation.
b.

Frequency and Extent of Reporting Obligations

Extensive mandatory reports covering the “volume of financial
resources and other assets acquired[,] . . prospective allocation of
said resources, [and the] purposes for which said resources are
spent or used” must be submitted by foreign NGOs on a quarterly
basis.265 This quarterly reporting obligation is in addition to
mandatory annual reporting for structural subdivisions of foreign
NGOs on “actual expenditure and utilization of financial
resources.”266 In the case of domestic NGOs, the regulations
require annual reporting containing
a report regarding the [NGO’s] activities, information regarding the composition of its governing bodies, documentation
containing information regarding financial spending and use of
other property, including assets acquired from international
and foreign organizations, foreign nationals and stateless
persons.267

In both instances, FRS-mandated reporting comes in addition to
any other reporting obligations required by other agencies, including Russia’s tax authority.268
263. Id. arts. 18, 32(11), (12).
264. Id. art. 32(15).
265. Press Release, M. Fradkov, Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation, Re: Decree No. 212 “On Measures Aimed at Implementing Certain Provisions of the
Federal Laws Regulating Activities of Non-commercial Organizations” (Apr. 15, 2006)
(ICNL trans.) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Decree No. 212]. “The implementation of
the NGO law began with ‘Decree No. 212’, which was issued by the Russian government on
15 April 2006 and came into effect with ‘Federal Law No. 18-FZ of 10 January 2006 on
introducing amendments to certain legislative acts of the Russian Federation’.” Elena Klitsounova, Promoting Human Rights in Russia by Supporting NGOs: How to Improve EU Strategies,
CEPS Working Document No. 287/April 2008, http://shop.ceps.eu/downfree.php?item_
id=1637.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. See ICNL, ANALYSIS OF LAW # 18-FZ, supra note 144, at 7.
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As the U.S. Department of State has observed, the information
required by the FRS may compel NGOs to disclose “potentially sensitive information, including sources of foreign funding and
detailed information as to how funds are used.”269 The requirement of quarterly reporting also may give rise to a significant
administrative burden, particularly for smaller NGOs. For example, Form No. OH0003 requires reporting information on the
actual use of every asset costing above approximately $360.00.270
Furthermore, the law is unclear as to whether a minor oversight in
financial reporting—for example, a misreported small donation
made by an individual donor or an unreported minor expenditure—may be invoked by the FRS as a basis for removing a foreign
NGO from the register on the grounds outlined in Article 32(9).271
Given these potentially high penalties, the need for foreign NGOs
to expend substantial financial and human resources to ensure full
compliance with the law’s provisions grows more apparent. This
reality is addressed more fully in Part VI, below, which explores the
current status of implementation regarding the NGO law.
2.

Nature of NGO Activities: Mandatory Advance Reporting on
Programs and Incompatibility with NGO Charters

Regulations supplementing the NGO law require foreign NGOs
to submit extensive annual reports to the FRS outlining programs
that the organization “plans to implement on the territory of the
Russian Federation” for the coming year.272 According to FRS forms,
required reporting on planned activities must include data on the
names, phone numbers, and passport numbers of participants at
events such as conferences.273 Although the regulations contain
some exceptions,274 it is unrealistic at best to expect all foreign
NGOs operating in Russia to know precisely what their program269. BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, RUSSIA:
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES – 2006, supra note 10, § 3.
270. ANALYSIS OF DECREE NO. 212, supra note 192, at 2.
271. See ICNL, ANALYSIS OF LAW # 18-FZ, supra note 144, at 7 (“Organizations that rely
on public fundraising, for example, may not know the citizenship of their many small
donors, and may not be able as a practical matter to report on all funds received from
foreign donors.”).
272. Decree No. 212, supra note 265.
273. Kaban, supra note 19. Under FRS Form No. OH0001, which addresses NGO
reporting on activities already undertaken, NGOs are required to provide the “number
and profile of participants of each event conducted . . . and how these events were publicized.” ANALYSIS OF DECREE NO. 212, supra note 192, at 2.
274. For example, where the NGO fails to provide information on a program one year
in advance, the regulations allow NGOs to report on planned programs “not later than 1
month prior to commencement of the program.” Decree No. 212, supra note 265. The
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matic plans may be for the coming year and which individuals will
be participating in them. Effectively, the law empowers the FRS to
use an unreported NGO program—perhaps initiated as an urgent
response to a string of xenophobic attacks or an earthquake—as
justification for excluding that organization from the register or
initiating liquidation proceedings.275 But FRS officials have sought
to quell such concerns as “imagined fears,” reasoning that most
NGOs develop work plans far in advance.276
Requiring foreign NGOs to report in advance on planned programs also creates an opportunity for significant state interference
in its operations. For example, the FRS can order a planned program cancelled or modified if it concludes that the program is
inconsistent with the NGO’s statutory goals or is otherwise contrary
to provisions of the NGO law.277 One representative from a leading American NGO privately characterized this power as essentially
giving the FRS a “line-item veto” on all foreign NGO activities.278
Interpreted broadly, the NGO law also may provide the FRS with
the ability to initiate liquidation proceedings against a foreign
NGO for the mere act of planning a program deemed to fall
outside of its mandate.
While the NGO law requires that NGOs be notified in writing
when the FRS determines that a given program is incompatible
with an organization’s statutory goals, the law provides no guidance
or objective grounds for enabling the FRS to reach such determinations.279 Rather, it leaves these findings to the FRS’s discretion
and, moreover, places the onus for contesting such a warning on
the NGO in question. This could have a chilling effect on the planning and execution of activities, particularly for foreign NGOs,
because once found to be acting outside of its charter or the information furnished in previous reports, the organization becomes
subject to exclusion from the registry without court order.
Although the law provides NGOs with the ability to contest such
law makes no provision for undertaking programs without advance notice being submitted
to the FRS.
275. These actions conceivably could be grounded on Article 32(12) or Article
18(2.1)(3). See Federal Law on Nonprofit Organizations, 1996, No. 7-FZ, arts. 32(13),
18(2.1)(3), available at http://www.usig.org/countryinfo/russia.asp (scroll down to “Applicable Laws”), amended by Federal Law on Introducing Amendments to Certain Legislative
Acts of the Russian Federation, 2006, No. 18-FZ, art. 3, available at http://www.usig.org/
countryinfo/russia.asp (scroll down to “Applicable Laws”).
276. Interview with Alexei Jafarov, supra note 192.
277. Fed. Law No. 7-FZ, art. 32(12).
278. Remarks at Freedom House Roundtable, supra note 136.
279. See Fed. Law No. 7-FZ, arts. 32(5)-(6).
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warning letters through the courts, this process inevitably
introduces impediments of its own, including the time and cost
associated with litigation.280 NGOs faced with a warning letter
might easily decide to forgo the impugned program rather than
incur the substantial expenditures of time, finances, and personnel
necessary to contest the FRS order. More troubling still, multiple
warnings from the FRS across a range of programmatic activities
being planned or undertaken by an NGO or group of NGOs might
put those or other organizations into a position where they cannot
act, are fearful to act, or simply preemptively elect to suspend activities altogether.
Although some powers enumerated above may be necessary to
advance legitimate state interests, absent clear and specific definitions of what constitutes an NGO “event,” and under which guidelines the FRS will interpret the statutory goals of an NGO or
determine whether NGO activity in fact complies with stated goals,
this provision281 gives the FRS significant discretion that may lead
to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of the NGO law. The
fact that NGOs are entitled to a warning and may petition the
court to appeal decisions ensuing from this provision does little to
temper this broad discretion and once again places the onus on
NGOs rather than requiring the FRS to satisfy any identifiable or
objective test before being able to act against an NGO’s legitimate
privacy, policy, and programmatic interests.
Rather, the discretionary powers that underpin the new NGO
law establish the FRS as the official arbiter of precisely which activities fall within or outside of an NGO’s mandate, raising a number
of disquieting questions: Will the FRS elect to interpret NGO mandates narrowly? Broadly? Or as intended by the scrutinized NGO’s
founders? Will NGOs need to amend their charters to account for
the new function of having to report to the FRS on a quarterly and
annual basis? Undoubtedly, this power of interpretation creates an
expansive gray area in the law, which in turn affords substantial
discretion to FRS officials and regional prosecutors, and upon
which hinges removal from the registry or the initiation of liquidation proceedings.282
280. As noted above, the RCFS unsuccessfully went through the Russian courts seeking
judicial relief. See supra Part IV.D. The founders of that organization are now confronted
with the financial, programmatic, and time costs associated with an appeal to the ECHR, as
well as establishing a new NGO.
281. Decree No. 212, supra note 265.
282. The NGO law provides that a “court claim requesting liquidation of a non-profit
organization may be lodged by a prosecutor of the relevant jurisdiction of the Russian
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FRS Authority to Control and Monitor NGO Activities

FRS Access to NGO Documents

FRS officials have stressed that the authority for oversight of
NGO documents, provided under Article 32, would be limited to
that which is necessary to determine whether an NGO’s activities
correspond to an organization’s charter.283 Although FRS officials
acknowledged that no written guidelines exist to delineate precisely which type of documents could be requested from an NGO,
or under what circumstances such requests could be made, they
stressed that any requests that overstepped the informal boundary
defined by FRS leadership would “not be tolerated and would be
punished” internally through informal controls.284 Despite best
assurances from the FRS, the failure to constrain this oversight
power by way of transparent regulations leaves open the possibility
of arbitrary governmental interference in NGO affairs. Without
any avenue for lodging complaints against overzealous or arbitrary
interpretation and application of the NGO law, this risk becomes
only more likely. Indeed, it is reasonable to envision a scenario
whereby virtually any document is related in some manner to an
NGO’s mandate and, therefore, subject to FRS review.
2.

FRS Participation in NGO Events

FRS officials also have claimed that their right to attend public
NGO events is unlimited.285 These officials further reasoned that
the ability to attend “internal” NGO events would require, in certain circumstances, an invitation from the NGO because they
“could not reasonably attend events of which they were unaware.”286 Yet, given the fact that other implementing regulations
mandate extensive advance reporting on all planned programs—
and the term “program” remains undefined—it is reasonable to
assume that the FRS will be in a position to demand that NGOs
report in advance all “events.” Thus, the FRS will indeed have foreknowledge of all foreign NGO events, whether public or interFederation” or by the FRS. Fed. Law No. 7-FZ, art. 18(1.1). The ability of both local prosecutors and the centralized FRS office to initiate liquidation proceedings gives rise to additional accountability concerns because it enables the FRS to claim that the matter is
outside of its jurisdiction or that the FRS is powerless to regulate the actions of local prosecutors. Accordingly, any efforts to monitor enforcement of the NGO law will require not
only the scrutiny of FRS’s actions, but also those of regional prosecutors.
283. Interview with FRS Senior Staff, supra note 134.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id.
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nal.287 Exercise of the FRS’s power to attend any NGO event may
have a chilling effect on NGO organizing and on participants’ willingness to attend such events.
3.

FRS Ability to Ban NGO Programs and Financial Transfers

The FRS’s ability to ban a foreign NGO’s implementation of a
pending program under Article 32(12) is linked directly to the law’s
requirement that such NGOs submit information on all planned
work one year in advance, as discussed supra in Part IV.E.2. This
provision allows the FRS, by way of “a written decision substantiating the ban,” essentially to compel an NGO to “terminate its activities in connection with the implementation of the said
program.”288 When an NGO fails to comply with the decision, the
law provides for “[the] exclusion of the said foreign non-profit
non-government organization’s . . . [affiliate] or representative
office from the register and liquidation of the . . . [branch office] of the
foreign non-profit non-governmental organization.”289 In other words,
not only can the FRS exclude an organization from the register
without court order (as is the case under Article 32(10) and (11)),
it also may be able—given the law’s silence on the latter power—to
liquidate an NGO with the same lack of due process.
Given that the NGO law already requires foreign NGOs to
divulge all information related to financial transfers and other
monetary activities, the FRS is well-positioned to prevent those
“transfer[s]” “to certain recipients of the said resources and other
properties” that it deems necessary “[f]or the purposes of protecting the basis of the Constitutional system, morality, health, rights
and lawful interests of other persons, and with the aim of defending the country and state security.”290 The NGO law, however,
makes no provision here regarding what, if any, penalties may
apply for noncompliance with the FRS-ordered ban, nor does it
specify the precise meaning of terms such as “other resources” or
“certain recipients.”

287.
288.
289.
290.

See supra Part IV.E.2.
Fed. Law No. 7-FZ, art. 32(12).
Id. art. 32(12) (emphasis added).
Id. art. 32(13).
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“MANY DIFFERENT COUNTRIES, MANY DIFFERENT CUSTOMS”:
BEST PRACTICES RELATED TO GOVERNMENT
REGULATION OF NGOS, INTERNATIONAL
STANDARDS, AND RUSSIA’S CONSTITUTION
A.

Overview

The previous Section highlighted the amended NGO law’s shortcomings with respect to even basic legislative drafting standards
and signaled that overbroad and vaguely drafted provisions will
permit—if not tacitly encourage—excessive and discretionary state
intervention within the NGO sector. Given that the law introduces
potential restrictions on any number of fundamental individual
and collective rights, it is worth taking the analysis one step further
by examining how the law interacts with both international and
regional human rights standards, as well as with standards introduced by the Russian Federation’s 1993 Constitution. This analysis
is facilitated by virtue of the fact that Russia’s Constitution explicitly provides that “the rights and freedoms of man and citizen are
recognized and guaranteed in conformity with the commonly recognized principles and norms of international law and this Constitution.”291 More significantly, the Constitution further provides
that:
The universally recognized principles and norms of the international law and the international treaties of the Russian Federation are a component part of its legal system. If an international
treaty of the Russian Federation stipulates other rules than those
established by the law, the rules of the international treaty shall
apply.292

Although the origin of the proverb for this Section cannot be
attributed directly to any Russian lineage, it has entered into the
Russian lexicon.293 While the trans-boundary migration of this
axiom makes it seem paradoxical or even anachronistic, the reality
perhaps is telling of a larger trend that is very much relevant here.
As countries can coalesce around a common proverb, adopting it
as part of their own custom, so too can they agree on minimum
standards with respect to fundamental rights such as freedom of
association and expression, as well as best practices for the regulation of NGOs. In other words, while some customs may indeed
continue to vary among states, the international community—and
particularly the European states—for the most part no longer dif291. Constitution, supra note 60, art. 17(1).
292. Id. art. 15(4).
293. The proverb reads accordingly in Russian: “
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fers on the scope and extent of the rights and duties implicated by
the NGO law. Rather, as this Section indicates, there is a single
emerging global “custom”294 to which Russia has consented yet is
falling short of satisfying.
Curiously, Russian officials have taken great pains to portray the
NGO law as being in line with regional and international standards. For example, Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs published
a chart ostensibly demonstrating that Russia’s NGO law compared
favorably with similar laws in other countries.295 Likewise, in January 2006, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov wrote an open letter to
critics of the draft NGO law restating the same arguments, including an assertion that the final law included many of the Council of
Europe’s (COE) recommendations.296 These efforts can only be
described as disingenuous at best. The Ministry study contains any
number of inaccuracies and false parallels, and altogether omits
consideration of the most egregious provisions of Russia’s NGO
law.297 Of note, the charts compiled by the Ministry fail to
acknowledge that Russia’s law empowers the authorities to demand
that NGOs terminate specific programs and ban financial transfers,
both without court order. Indeed, at least two independent observers have questioned the legitimacy of the Russian effort, with both
concluding that the comparative document suffers from grave
flaws.298
294. For example, the World Bank has indicated that “it can be argued that international law imposes an obligation on countries to enact sound NGO laws” as a requirement
for satisfying “the full and meaningful implementation of the freedoms of association and
speech.” ICNL, WORLD BANK, HANDBOOK ON GOOD PRACTICES FOR LAWS RELATING TO NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (DISCUSSION DRAFT) 12 (1997) [hereinafter HANDBOOK ON
GOOD PRACTICES].
295. The chart is available in Russian from the Russian Federation’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs Department of Information and Press, http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/sps/92
D694A466198D4AC325711E0045C8DB (Feb. 23, 2006).
296. Sergey Lavrov, Open Letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov, NOVYE
IZVESTIIA, Jan. 18, 2006, at 1, 2. As noted, the Council of Europe (COE) has contested this
claim. See infra note 346 and accompanying text.
297. Russian Federation’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs Department of Information and
Press, http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/sps/92D694A466198D4AC325711E0045C8DB (Feb.
23, 2006).
298. See, e.g., ICNL, ANALYSIS OF THE CHART PREPARED BY THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION COMPARING SEVERAL COUNTRIES’ LAWS REGULATING
NGOS 2 (2006), available at http://www.lawcs.ru/doc/law/analysis_eng.doc (concluding
that “the Russian law is more restrictive than the laws on NGOs from the other countries
used for comparison.”); see also JOSH MACHLEDER, INDEM FOUND., CONTEXTUAL AND LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE RUSSIAN LAW ON NGOS 27-31 (2006) (discussing the law in relation to
international law and practice), available at http://www.indem.ru/en/publicat/
Russian_NGO_Law_03252006.pdf.
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The World Bank has undertaken a more reasoned approach to
NGO law standards. In its study of best practices, the Bank’s
experts conclude that laws governing NGOs “should be written and
administered so that it is relatively quick, easy, and inexpensive to
establish an NGO as a legal person. Establishment should also be
allowed for branches of both foreign and domestic NGOs.”299 Further, the registration process “should require filing a minimum
number of clearly defined documents and should be a ministerial
act involving a minimum of bureaucratic judgment or discretion.”300 As demonstrated above, the Russian system is neither
quick nor easy. Moreover, while the actual registration application
fee is nominal, other associated costs—time required to complete
the registration process and costs related to translation, notarization, and legal advice services—expose a system that can quickly
become prohibitive for all but the most well-funded prospective
applicants.301
In a similar vein, the World Bank’s experts acknowledged “the
ever-present danger of over-regulation by the government, or,
indeed, the use of reporting and audit requirements to harass
NGOs that are critical of the government or otherwise unpopular.”302 To minimize this risk, the authors reason that, “to the maximum feasible extent, reports should be as simple to complete and
as uniform among agencies as is possible”303 and that “small organizations should be given simplified reporting requirements or
exempted altogether”304—two simple steps the Russian NGO law
failed to adopt. Moreover, the World Bank’s study has concluded
that the
fear that foreign funders are trying to subvert the security of the
state is not well grounded . . . . So long as the laws requiring
299. HANDBOOK ON GOOD PRACTICES, supra note 294, at 34. See generally LEON E. IRISH,
ROBERT KUSHEN & KARLA W. SIMON, OPEN SOCIETY INSTITUTE, GUIDELINES FOR LAWS AFFECTING CIVIC ORGANIZATIONS (2d ed. 2004) (further refining and developing these best practice principles), available at http://www.icnl.org/knowledge/pubs/Guidelines.pdf. These
best practices are also echoed in a set of principles recently publicized by the U.S. Department of State. See BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF
STATE, GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (2006), available at
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/77771.htm.
300. HANDBOOK ON GOOD PRACTICES, supra note 294, at 36.
301. For example, Ole Solvang, Executive Director of SRJI, estimates that his organization spent several thousand euros on the registration process, in addition to time spent by
staff trying to navigate and comply with FRS requirements as well as being forced to suspend activities for five months. Telephone Interview with Ole Solvang, supra note 226.
302. HANDBOOK ON GOOD PRACTICES, supra note 294, at 68.
303. Id. at 67.
304. Id. at 68.
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accountability and transparency from NGOs are applied firmly
but fairly, the responsible organ will know whether any NGO,
whether funded locally or from abroad, has used funds
improperly.305

Beyond identified best practices, the NGO law’s vague criteria
and broad discretion for denying registration may also conflict with
Russia’s regional and international human rights obligations, as
well as with the Russian Constitution. Under the European Convention, “Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly
and to freedom of association with others, including the right to
form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.”306
The European Convention and ICCPR contain virtually identical
guarantees concerning freedom of association, which elaborate on
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ promise of “the right
to freedom of peaceful assembly and association.”307 However, the
ECHR has been far more active in developing the content and
scope of that right, in part because it benefits from stronger
enforcement mechanisms than the U.N. Human Rights Committee.308 Jeremy McBride has observed that
given the lack of specificity in the language used in most of the
[international] guarantees, the most helpful source of guidance
in determining the scope of the general freedom of association
is to be derived from the case law generated under those instruments which enable individual or collective claims to be
brought.309
305. Id. at 93. If an organization has acted illegally, “vigorous steps should be taken to
correct the abuse and preclude its repetition.” Id.
306. European Convention, supra note 13, art. 11(1). The ICCPR similarly provides
that “[e]veryone shall have the right to freedom of association with others, including the
right to form and join trade unions for the protection of his interests.” ICCPR, supra note
14, art. 22(1).
307. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, art. 20(1), U.N. GAOR,
3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948).
308. In fact, the rights of peaceful assembly (Article 21) and freedom of association
(Article 22) are some of the least-developed rights addressed under the ICCPR. For example, the U.N.’s Human Rights Committee has not produced a general comment on either
of these articles. See Human Rights Committee – General Comments, http://
www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/comments.htm (listing the articles on which the
Committee has commented) (last visited July 9, 2008). Some questions are being raised,
however, about NGO rights related to freedom of association. See, e.g., Human Rights
Committee, Summary Record of the 2050th meeting, Consideration of Reports Submitted
by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant (Egypt), CCPR/C/SR.2050 24 Oct. 24,
2002, at para. 47.
309. JEREMY MCBRIDE, NGO RIGHTS AND THEIR PROTECTION UNDER INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 5 (2004), available at http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2004/
09/3666_en.pdf.
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With this understanding in mind, the following Section primarily
focuses on the ECHR’s jurisprudence, with the understanding that
Russia’s obligations extend equally to the international level by virtue of its ratification of the ICCPR.
B.

The Right to Freedom of Association as Related to NGOs

In United Communist Party of Turkey & Others v. Turkey, the ECHR
ruled that the right to freedom of association was not limited to
trade unions, because
the conjunction “including” clearly shows that trade unions are
but one example among others of the form in which the right to
freedom of association may be exercised. It is therefore not possible to conclude . . . that by referring to trade unions . . . those
who drafted the Convention intended to exclude political parties from the scope of Article 11.310

The Court added that more persuasive than the wording of Article 11 was “the fact that political parties are a form of association
essential to the proper functioning of democracy. In view of the
importance of democracy in the Convention system . . . there can
be no doubt that political parties come within the scope of Article
11.”311 By the same rationale—and by virtue of the crucial function NGOs play in a democratic society—Article 11 protection
should apply fully to the right of individuals to form and join
NGOs. Indeed, the Court decisively concluded as much in Gorzelik
& Others v. Poland, by stating as follows:
While in the context of Article 11 the Court has often referred
to the essential role played by political parties in ensuring pluralism and democracy, associations formed for other purposes,
including those protecting cultural or spiritual heritage . . . seeking an ethnic identity or asserting a minority consciousness, are
also important to the proper functioning of democracy. For
pluralism is also built on the genuine recognition of, and
respect for, diversity and the dynamics of cultural traditions, ethnic and cultural identities, religious beliefs, artistic, literary and
socio-economic ideas and concepts. The harmonious interaction of persons and groups with varied identities is essential for
achieving social cohesion. It is only natural that, where a civil
society functions in a healthy manner, the participation of citizens in the democratic process is to a large extent achieved
310. United Communist Party of Turk. v. Turkey, App. No. 19392/92, ¶ 24 (Eur. Ct.
H.R. Jan. 30, 1998), http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int////tkp197/viewhbkm.asp?action=open&
table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649&key=709&sessionId=1729060&skin=hu
doc-en&attachment=true.
311. Id. ¶ 25.
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through belonging to associations in which they may integrate
with each other and pursue common objectives collectively.312

This statement built upon pre-existing ECHR jurisprudence concerning the right to establish NGOs, which affirmed that:
The right to form an association is an inherent part of the right
set forth in Article 11 of the [European] Convention. The ability to form a legal entity in order to act collectively in a field of
mutual interest is one of the most important aspects of the right
to freedom of association, without which that right would be
deprived of any meaning. The way in which national legislation
enshrines this freedom and its practical application by the authorities
reveal the state of democracy in the country concerned.313

The Court also concluded in United Communist Party of Turkey
that “an association . . . is not excluded from the protection
afforded by the Convention simply because its activities are
regarded by the national authorities as undermining the constitutional structures of the State and calling for the imposition of
restrictions.”314 Significantly, the Court added that:
notwithstanding its autonomous role and particular sphere of
application, Article 11 must also be considered in the light of
Article 10 [covering freedom of expression]. The protection of
opinions and the freedom to express them is one of the objectives of the freedoms of assembly and association as enshrined in
Article 11.315

In light of this, the Court stressed that the interaction between Articles 10 and 11 was even more relevant in relation to political parties, because of “their essential role in ensuring pluralism and the

312. Gorzelik v. Poland, App. No. 44158/98, ¶ 92 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 17, 2004), http:/
/cmiskp.echr.coe.int////tkp197/viewhbkm.asp?action=open&table=F69A27FD8FB86142
BF01C1166DEA398649&key=4216&sessionId=1729060&skin=hudoc-en&attachment=true.
The Court reiterates this principle in Zhechev v. Bulgaria, App. No. 57045/00, ¶ 35 (Eur.
Ct. H.R. June 21, 2007), http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int////tkp197/viewhbkm.asp?action=
open&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649&key=62981&sessionId=1729060&
skin=hudoc-en&attachment=true.
313. Zhechev, App. No. 57045/00, ¶ 34 (emphasis added). For similar prior statements
by the Court, see Moscow Branch of the Salvation Army v. Russia, App. No. 72881/01, ¶ 59
(Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 5, 2006), http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int////tkp197/viewhbkm.asp?
action=open&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649&key=58518&sessionId=17
29060&skin=hudoc-en&attachment=true. This cornerstone principle of the right to freedom of association was first expressed by the ECHR in Sidiropoulos v. Greece, App. No.
57/1997/841/1047, ¶ 40 (Eur. Ct. H.R. July 10, 1998), http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int////tkp
197/viewhbkm.asp?action=open&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649&key=
786&sessionId=1729060&skin=hudoc-en&attachment=true.
314. United Communist Party of Turk., App. No. 19392/92, ¶ 27.
315. Id. ¶ 42.
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proper functioning of democracy.”316 This, again, is a conclusion
extended by the Court to NGOs:
Given that the implementation of the principle of pluralism is
impossible without an association being able to express freely its
ideas and opinions . . . the protection of opinions and the freedom of expression within the meaning of Article 10 of the Convention is one of the objectives of the freedom of association . . .
Such a link is particularly relevant where . . . the authorities’ stance
towards an association was in reaction to its views and statements.317

Finally, the ECHR rightly concluded in United Communist Party of
Turkey that the protection afforded by Article 11 “would be largely
theoretical and illusory if it were limited to the founding of an association, since the national authorities could immediately disband
the association without having to comply with the Convention.”318
To that end, the Court held that “the protection afforded by Article 11 lasts for an association’s entire life and that dissolution of an
association by a country’s authorities must accordingly satisfy the
requirements [set forth] in paragraph 2 of that” article.319
In a related vein, the ongoing efforts of the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to better elucidate
state obligations related to freedom of association reaffirm the
direction of the ECHR’s jurisprudence. At the same time, Russia’s
long-standing membership320 in this organization serves as further
concrete evidence of that country’s endorsement of the emerging
standards related to freedom of association, particularly as they
apply to NGOs. For example, the OSCE’s 1990 Copenhagen Document321 expressed the commitment of participating states to
316. Id. ¶ 43.
317. Zhechev, App. No. 57045/00, ¶ 36 (emphasis added). See also Stankov & the
United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden v. Bulgaria, Apps. Nos. 29221/95 and 29225/95,
¶ 85 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 2, 2001), http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int////tkp197/viewhbkm.asp?
action=open&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649&key=2269&sessionId=17
29060&skin=hudoc-en&attachment=true (“The protection of opinions and the freedom to
express them is one of the objectives of the freedoms of assembly and association as
enshrined in Article 11 . . . . ”).
318. United Communist Party of Turk., App. No. 19392/92, ¶ 33.
319. Id.
320. The U.S.S.R. was admitted to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE) on June 25, 1973. OSCE: About – Participating States, http://
www.osce.org/about/13131.html#R (last visited July 10, 2008).
321. The Copenhagen Document reflected the conclusions reached during the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). As the CSCE became more institutionalized
during the 1990s it evolved into the Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe
(OSCE). See OSCE, End of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human
Dimension of the CSCE, http://www.osce.org/item/15352.html. According to the OSCE,
this document “remains the most important source of OSCE commitments in the human
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“ensure that individuals are permitted to exercise the right to association, including the right to form, join and participate effectively
in non-governmental organizations which seek the promotion and
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including
trade unions and human rights monitoring groups.”322
The OSCE’s acknowledgement of the key role played by NGOs
in promoting democratic society also mirrors the ECHR’s jurisprudence. The Copenhagen Document recognizes “the important
role” of NGOs, including human rights organizations, “in the promotion of tolerance, cultural diversity and the resolution of questions relating to national minorities.”323 This understanding was
deepened by the 1991 Moscow Document, which provides that participating States “will facilitate the ability of [NGOs] to conduct
their national activities freely on their territories”324 and will “welcome NGO activities, including, inter alia, observing compliance
with [OSCE] commitments in the field of the human dimension.”325 In 1999, the OSCE expanded this understanding,
acknowledging that NGOs “can perform a vital role in the promotion of human rights, democracy and the rule of law” and pledging
further “to enhance the ability of NGOs to make their full contribution to the further development of civil society and respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms.”326 Given the content of
Russia’s NGO law and the manner of its enforcement to date, it is
difficult to conclude that the Russian government is meeting these
regional undertakings.

dimension. It established that the protection and promotion of human rights is one of the
basic purposes of government and that their recognition constitutes the foundation of
freedom, justice and peace.” Id.
322. OSCE, Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension
of the CSCE, at I-10.3 (June 29, 1990), available at http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/
1990/06/13992_en.pdf. This commitment is reaffirmed in the 1990 Charter of Paris for a
New Europe. See OSCE, Charter of Paris for a New Europe, at 3 (Nov. 21, 1990), available at
http://www.osce.org/item/4047.html. Russia signed the Charter of Paris on Nov. 21,
1990. See OSCE: About – Participating States, supra note 320.
323. Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the
CSCE, supra note 322, at IV-30.
324. OSCE, Document of the Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the
CSCE, at III-43 (Oct. 4, 1991), available at http://www.osce.org/documents/html/pdfto
html/13995_en.pdf.html.
325. Id. at III-43.3.
326. OSCE, Charter for European Security, at III-27 (Nov. 18, 1999), available at http://
www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1999/11/17497_en.pdf.
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Legitimate Limitations on the Right to Freedom of Association

Admittedly, the right to freedom of association is not without
certain limitations. The limits set forth in Article 11(2) of the
European Convention are similar to those enumerated under the
ICCPR. Both treaties permit restrictions of freedom of association
only where prescribed by law and deemed necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety,
for the prevention of disorder or crime (to maintain public order),
for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others.327
According to ECHR jurisprudence, any limitation on this right
ultimately must be proportional to the legitimate objective sought
by the government.328 Moreover, the ECHR has held that the list
of exceptions contained in Article 11(2) is exhaustive. In Salvation
Army v. Russia, the Court reiterated its view that: “[t]he exceptions
to the rule of freedom of association are to be construed strictly
and only convincing and compelling reasons can justify restrictions
on that freedom.”329
Again, the OSCE’s position strengthens the Court’s findings with
respect to the scope of limitations impinging on freedom of association. The Copenhagen Document affirms that “participating
States” agree to
ensure that the exercise of all the human rights and fundamental freedoms . . . will not be subject to any restrictions except
those which are provided by law and are consistent with their
obligations under international law, in particular the [ICCPR],
and with their international commitments, in particular the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. These restrictions have the
character of exceptions. The participating States will ensure
that these restrictions are not abused and are not applied in an
arbitrary manner, but in such a way that the effective exercise of
these rights is ensured. Any restriction on rights and freedoms must,

327. See European Convention, supra note 13, art. 11(2); ICCPR, supra note 14, art.
22(2).
328. Gorzelik v. Poland, supra note 312, ¶ 96.
329. Moscow Branch of the Salvation Army v. Russia, App. No. 72881/01, ¶ 76 (Eur.
Ct. H.R. Oct. 5, 2006), http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int////tkp197/viewhbkm.asp?action=
open&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649&key=58518&sessionId=1729060&
skin=hudoc-en&attachment=true; see also Sidiropoulos v. Greece, App. No. 57/1997/841/
1047, ¶ 40 (Eur. Ct. H.R. July 10, 1998), http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int////tkp197/
viewhbkm.asp?action=open&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649&key=786&
sessionId=1729060&skin=hudoc-en&attachment=true.
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in a democratic society, relate to one of the objectives of the applicable law
and be strictly proportionate to the aim of that law.330

Nothing in these international instruments or in the jurisprudence of the ECHR would appear to envision restrictions on the
fundamental human right to freedom of association based on such
vague grounds as threats to a country’s “sovereignty,” “cultural heritage,” or “unique character.” In fact, the ECHR has specifically
ruled that efforts to limit freedom of association on similar
grounds, such as “upholding . . . cultural traditions and historical
and cultural symbols,” do not constitute legitimate government
aims under Article 11(2) of the European Convention.331 In tandem with this, the Court has stated that
Sweeping measures of a preventive nature to suppress freedom
of assembly and expression other than in cases of incitement to
violence or rejection of democratic principles—however shocking and unacceptable certain views or words used may appear to
the authorities, and however illegitimate the demands made
may be—do a disservice to democracy and often even endanger
it.332

Clearly, the FRS’s ability to preemptively ban a foreign NGO’s
planned program represents such a sweeping measure and plainly
goes against the Court’s understanding of a legitimate limitation
on freedom of association.
Other distinctions in treatment between domestic and foreign
NGOs created by Russia’s NGO law similarly may signal limitations
on the right to freedom of association that are not condoned by
either international law or best practice. According to the World
Bank, “[t]he rules for foreign NGO establishment should generally
be the same as for domestic NGO establishment . . . . Similarly,
there should be no special rules or limitation for NGOs that
include foreign nationals on their board or staff.”333 As discussed
above, the Russian NGO law draws a number of discriminatory distinctions between treatment of domestic and foreign NGOs, as well
as citizens and non-citizens. Among other things, depending on
330. Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the
CSCE, supra note 322, at II-24 (emphasis added).
331. Sidiropoulos, App. No. 57/1997/841/1047, ¶¶ 37-38.
332. Stankov & the United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden v. Bulgaria, Apps. Nos.
29221/95 and 29225/95, ¶ 97 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 2, 2001), http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int///
/tkp197/viewhbkm.asp?action=open&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649&
key=2269&sessionId=1729060&skin=hudoc-en&attachment=true.
333. HANDBOOK ON GOOD PRACTICES, supra note 294, at 35. Other best practice guides
similarly conclude that “[t]he law should provide a level playing field for foreign and
domestic organizations.” IRISH, KUSHEN & SIMON, supra note 299, at 88.
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how the term “undesirable” is interpreted in Article 15(1.2)(1), the
NGO law also may conflict with the COE’s Fundamental Principles on
the Status of Non-governmental Organisations in Europe, which provides
that “[a]ny person, be it legal or natural, national or foreign
national, or group of such persons, should be free to establish an
NGO.”334
The World Bank states that a government “should be required to
provide a written statement of reasons for any refusal to establish
an NGO,”335 and the principles enunciated by the COE also establish that a “change in the statutes of an NGO . . . should require
approval by a public authority only where its name or its objectives are
affected.”336 As observed above, the Russian NGO law falls short of
these basic standards on both counts. First, all NGOs are required
to resubmit a registration application in the event of any changes to
the organization’s constituent documents.337 Second, the FRS is
334. COE, Fundamental Principles on the Status of Non-governmental Organisations in Europe,
3 (Nov. 13, 2002), available at http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal_affairs/legal_co-operation/
civil_society/basic_texts/Fundamental%20Principles%20E.asp. The COE’s Fundamental
Principles were motivated by a desire to “provide guidance to states that are currently
reforming their legislation on NGOs”, to contribute to “the harmonisation of European
legal systems” and to “enlarging the number of . . . contracting parties” to the European
Convention on the Recognition of the Legal Personality of International Non-Governmental Organisations (ETS No. 124), of which Russia is not a signatory; see also COUNCIL OF
EUROPE, EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON THE RECOGNITION OF THE LEGAL PERSONALITY OF INTERNATIONAL NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS (2008), available at http://conventions.coe.
int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=124&CM=1&DF=11/14/2008&CL=ENG (showing that that Russia is not a signatory to ETS 124). Although the fundamental principles
“have no legal force under the rules and regulations of the Council of Europe,” a new
“Draft Recommendation on the Legal Status of Non-Governmental Organisations in
Europe” mirrors most of its content and, if approved by the COE’s Committee of Ministers,
would become “a new non-binding legal instrument.” COE, Draft Recommendation on the
Legal Status of Non-Governmental Organisations in Europe and Its Explanatory Memorandum, at
12 (Mar. 21, 2007), available at http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal_affairs/legal_co%2Doperation/civil_society/Meeting_documents/CDCJ%20_2007_%2020%20e%20fin%20prov%20
%20recom%20legal%20status%20NGOs%2021%20MARCH.pdf.
335. HANDBOOK ON GOOD PRACTICES, supra note 294, at 38.
336. COE, Fundamental Principles on the Status of Non-governmental Organisations in Europe,
supra note 334, ¶ 42 (emphasis added). The accompanying explanatory note to the Fundamental Principles elucidates the rationale for this principle: “The rule laid down in paragraph 42 . . . is intended to ensure that the statutes of an NGO can be amended under a
simple, expedited procedure. Approval should only be needed in the case of significant matters, such
as the name or objectives of an NGO.” COE, Explanatory Memorandum to the Fundamental
Principles on the Status of Non-governmental Organisations in Europe, ¶ 51 (Nov. 13, 2002)
(emphasis added), available at http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal_affairs/legal_co-operation/
civil_society/basic_texts/Fundamental%20Principles%20E.asp.
337. Federal Law on Nonprofit Organizations, 1996, No. 7-FZ, art. 23(1), available at
http://www.usig.org/countryinfo/russia.asp (scroll down to “Applicable Laws”), amended
by Federal Law on Introducing Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian
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not required to provide written reasons in all instances of denial of
registration.338
Perhaps not by coincidence, the ECHR recently discussed the
deleterious effect of denial of registration in the context of Russian
law. In Salvation Army v. Russia, the Court found that the process
imposed on religious organizations seeking reregistration339
“necessitated complex bureaucratic steps and a diversion of
resources from [the organization’s] activity.”340 Additionally, the
refusal to reregister an organization created “negative publicity
which severely undermined . . . efforts at charitable fund-raising
and generated distrust among landlords” and “made it impossible
for twenty-five foreign employees and seven non-Moscow Russian
employees to obtain residence registration.”341
In light of the NGO law’s similarly onerous provisions concerning registration, these issues will likely again become the focus of
ECHR scrutiny and probably lead to the same judicial conclusion
by the Court. Indeed, a legal analysis of the draft NGO law undertaken on behalf of the COE in 2005 has already concluded, inter
alia, that certain provisions “lend themselves to subjective determinations and are so broad that they may easily be abused” and that
“second-guessing or speculation about the true intentions of the
founders of the organization” runs contrary to existing ECHR jurisprudence.342 As an alternative, the COE opinion recommended
that the more appropriate route would be for the NGO law “to
judge an association by its actions, which, if unlawful, [could] give
rise to legal steps to dissolve it.”343 With respect to liquidation provisions, the COE’s Fundamental Principles conclude that: “The legal
personality of an NGO should only be terminated pursuant to the
voluntary act of its members—or, in the case of a non-membership
Federation, 2006, No. 18-FZ, art. 3, available at http://www.usig.org/countryinfo/russia.asp
(scroll down to “Applicable Laws”); see supra Part III.D.1.
338. See Fed. Law No. 7-FZ, arts. 13.2(8), 23.1(3)-(4); see also supra Part III.D.2.
339. Fed. Law No. 125-FZ governs the registration, activity, and liquidation of religious
organizations in Russia; see supra notes 69, 132 and accompanying text.
340. Moscow Branch of the Salvation Army v. Russia, App. No. 72881/01, ¶ 30 (Eur.
Ct. H.R. Oct. 5, 2006), http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int////tkp197/viewhbkm.asp?action=
open&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649&key=58518&sessionId=1729060&
skin=hudoc-en&attachment=true.
341. Id. ¶¶ 31, 33.
342. J. TYMEN VAN DER PLOEG, COE, PROVISIONAL OPINION ON AMENDMENTS TO FEDERAL
LAWS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION REGARDING NON-PROFIT ORGANISATIONS AND PUBLIC
ASSOCIATIONS ¶ 21 (2005), available at http://www.coe.int/t/e/com/press/news/2005/
20051206_opinion.asp.
343. VAN DER PLOEG, supra note 342, ¶ 21.
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NGO, its management—in the event of bankruptcy, prolonged
inactivity or misconduct.”344
Based on the analysis above, and as the case of the Educated
Media Foundation (EMF) discussed below demonstrates,345 the
Russian NGO law clashes with the COE’s Fundamental Principles
insofar as it attaches vicarious liability to NGOs for the “misconduct” of individuals affiliated with those organizations. To be certain, such actions go beyond the threshold of the COE’s principles
and inevitably have a chilling effect on the activities and affiliations
maintained by other NGOs, thereby further limiting exercise of the
right to freedom of association. Indeed, while Russian officials
claim that the final NGO law satisfies all COE recommendations,
Mr. Rene van der Linden, president of the Parliamentary Assembly
of the COE, publicly expressed the Council’s dissatisfaction with
the role Russian authorities provided to it during discussions on
the preparation of the law.346
D.

The Right to Privacy

The FRS’s ability to attend events or demand documents also
gives rise to potential violations of Russia’s obligations under Article 8 of the European Convention and Article 17 of the ICCPR.
Article 8 of the European Convention provides the following:
1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family
life, his home and his correspondence.
2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the
exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law
and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of
national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others.347

Although it may be argued that the privacy right enunciated in
Article 8 only applies to the private life of an individual, the ECHR
concluded in Niemietz v. Germany that
344. COE, Fundamental Principles on the Status of Non-governmental Organisations in Europe,
supra note 334, ¶ 25.
345. See infra Part VI.A (discussing the Educated Media Foundation (EMF) case).
346. Press Conference with Rene van der Linden, President, Parliamentary Assembly of
the COE (Jan. 12, 2007), INTERFAX. To be certain, this Article underscores the fact that the
final law did not address most of the COE’s concerns.
347. European Convention, supra note 13, art. 8. The ICCPR provides that: “No one
shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or
correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation” and that
“[e]veryone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.”
ICCPR, supra note 14, art. 17.
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There appears . . . to be no reason of principle why . . . the
notion of “private life” should be taken to exclude activities of a
professional or business nature since it is, after all, in the course
of their working lives that the majority of people have a significant, if not the greatest, opportunity of developing relationships
with the outside world. . . . More generally, to interpret the
words “private life” and “home” as including certain professional or business activities or premises would be consonant with
the essential object and purpose of Article 8 . . . namely to protect the individual against arbitrary interference by the public
authorities.348

As McBride has concluded,
There ought not, therefore, to be any power to search the association’s premises and seize documents and other material there
without there being objective grounds for taking such measures.
Furthermore the authorisation for them ought to be given by a
judge and the terms of an [sic] warrant ought to be precise . . .
and it applies whether or not the object of the . . . [search] is an
individual or an association.349

This understanding is confirmed by COE Fundamental Principle
No. 67, which states that “NGOs should not be subject to any power
to search their premises and seize documents and other material
there without objective grounds for taking such measures and
prior judicial authorisation.”350 Also, the COE’s analysis of the
oversight provisions enumerated in Article 32 of Russia’s NGO law
concludes, inter alia, that the supervisory powers granted to the FRS
“appear to be excessive and it is necessary to circumscribe them
more precisely,” that “[u]nlimited power for state representatives
to attend events interferes with the autonomy of NGOs,” and
finally, that any intervention “should be restricted to cases where
there are reasonable grounds for suspicion that the legislation in
force has been violated.”351
However reassuring, statements by the FRS that their powers to
obtain documents would be exercised with responsibility and
restraint simply do not satisfy the level of transparency and objectivity the ECHR and COE demand.352 Further, as McBride correctly observes, where privacy rights are not respected from the
348. Niemietz v. Germany, App. No. 13710/88, ¶¶ 29, 31 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 16, 1992),
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int////tkp197/viewhbkm.asp?action=open&table=F69A27FD8FB
86142BF01C1166DEA398649&key=468&sessionId=1729060&skin=hudoc-en&attachment=
true.
349. MCBRIDE, supra note 309, at 61.
350. COE, Fundamental Principles on the Status of Non-governmental Organisations in Europe,
supra note 334, ¶ 67.
351. VAN DER PLOEG, supra note 342, ¶¶ 26, 29.
352. See supra Part IV.F.1 (describing these FRS statements).
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outset, and where NGOs are not placed in a position to challenge
the state before an independent judge with full jurisdiction, “there
will undoubtedly be violations of the rights to a fair hearing and an
effective remedy,”353 thus triggering a snowball effect leading to
additional violations of European Convention obligations, such as
the right to a fair trial contained in Article 6.
E.

A Brief Note on Terrorism and International Obligations

As noted above, one of the ostensible justifications for amendments to the NGO law stemmed from a perceived need to “combat
terrorism and stop foreign spies using NGOs as cover.”354
Although protecting Russia’s citizens and combating international
terrorism may in fact represent legitimate grounds for regulating
the NGO sector, the international community is of one mind that
such actions cannot come at the expense of respect for fundamental human rights standards. As early as 2002, the OSCE explicitly
declared in its Charter on Preventing and Combating Terrorism, that “all
counter-terrorism measures and co-operation [should be conducted] in accordance with the rule of law, the United Nations
Charter and the relevant provisions of international law, international standards of human rights and . . . international humanitarian
law.”355 U.N. Security Council Resolution 1624 soon followed the
OSCE Charter and reiterated this balancing requirement by
stressing that all governments “ensure that any measures taken to
combat terrorism comply with all of their obligations under international law . . . in particular international human rights law, refugee
law, and humanitarian law.”356 It is doubtful, from the analysis
presented above, that the Russian NGO law in its current form succeeds in upholding this vital balance.
F.

The Russian Constitution

The amended NGO law conflicts with more than international
and regional human rights standards. The human rights protections provided under the Russian Federation’s 1993 Constitution
likewise signal that the NGO law clashes with what are intended to
be supreme domestic legal norms. Article 55 of the Russian Constitution states, “[i]n the Russian Federation no laws must be adopted
353. MCBRIDE, supra note 309, at 62.
354. Kaban, supra note 19.
355. OSCE, Charter on Preventing and Combating Terrorism, ¶ 7, MC DOC/1/02 (Dec. 7,
2002) (emphasis added), available at http://www.osce.org/item/4162.html.
356. S.C. Res. 1624, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1624 (Sept. 14, 2005) (emphasis added).
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which abolish or diminish human and civil rights and freedoms.”357
Furthermore, any restrictions on individual rights and freedoms
are permitted “only to the extent necessary to protect the foundations of the constitutional order, morals, health, rights and lawful
interests of other people, and for ensuring the defense of the country and the security of the State.”358
The Russian Constitution also provides that, “[e]veryone has the
right to association . . . to protect their interests. The freedom of
public association activities is guaranteed.”359 It establishes that
“[p]ublic associations are equal before the law”360 and “guarantees
the equality of rights and freedoms without regard to gender, race,
nationality, language, origin, property or employment condition,
attitude toward religion, membership in public associations or any
other circumstances.”361 Furthermore, the Russian Constitution guarantees every individual’s “right to privacy of correspondence, telephone conversations, post, telegraphic and other communications”
and specifies that restrictions “on this right may be imposed only
by a decision of the court.”362
Observers of the Russian judiciary have argued that the Constitutional Court “has steadily accumulated political and moral capital
essential to its mission within the constitutional system and, in the
process, accrued the respect, or at least the political deference, of
all significant players in the political game.”363 Despite this apparent—however tenuous—respect and the clear enumeration of
rights in the Russian Constitution, there is no signal from the judicial branch that it will interpret and apply the Constitution with a
rights-based approach in mind. Indeed, the backlog of Russian
cases pending at the ECHR testifies to the fact that the courts are
playing enabler to the government’s policies, possibly reflecting a
throwback to the Soviet era of “telephone justice,” whereby govern-

357. Constitution, supra note 60, art. 55(2).
358. Id. art. 55(3). Admittedly, these allowances may be broader than those permitted
under international law.
359. Id. art. 30(1) (emphasis added). It should be noted that this provision is drafted
in a manner that makes it applicable to every individual, rather than only to citizens of the
Russian Federation.
360. Id. art. 13(4).
361. Id. art. 19(2) (emphasis added).
362. Id. art. 23(2).
363. Robert Sharlet, Constitutional Law and Politics in Russia: Surviving the First Decade, 11
DEMOKRATIZATSIYA 122, 127-28 (2003).
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ment officials called in the “correct” verdict to the judge hearing
the case.364
Interestingly, Chairman of the Russian Constitutional Court
Valery Zorkin recently bemoaned the rising number of complaints365 against the Russian Federation being directed to the
European Court, calling the phenomenon “a crisis of our legal system” that reveals “serious mistakes in the Russian judicial system, in
the operation of law enforcement bodies and authority as a
whole.”366 He further labeled discussions within the Duma aimed
at limiting Russian exposure to the ECHR as “absurd and unrealistic,” given that the European Convention is now part of the Russian
legal system.367 That said, the Chairman did endorse an approach
that would enable Russian citizens “to file human rights cases
against the state in Russian courts—something they cannot do
now.”368 The passage of such a proposal represents a doubleedged sword: On the one hand, it may allow for Russian citizens to
obtain justice in-line with European Convention rights directly in
their own country; on the other, it may delay that justice by prolonging the court hearings required before Russian citizens can
achieve an exhaustion of domestic remedies. This potential delay
is only exacerbated by a long-standing skepticism among COE
members concerning the “perceived inexperience or inability [of
Russia’s courts] to apply effectively constitutional provisions dictat364. See Kahn, supra note 115, at 379. Alexander Solzhenitsyn described the concept
thusly: “In his mind’s eye the judge can always see the shiny black visage of truth—the
telephone in his chambers. This oracle will never fail you, as long as you do what it says.”
Id. at 385 (quoting 3 ALEXANDER SOLZHENITSYN, THE GULAG ARCHIPELAGO 521 (1974)); see
also Kathryn Hendley, Assessing the Rule of Law in Russia, 14 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L.
347, 352 (2006) (arguing that recent cases, the results of which were clearly manipulated
by the Kremlin, are aberrations and should not be viewed as reflective of the capacity of
the Russian legal system).
365. Report: Top Russian Judge Calls for Barring Citizens from Appealing to European Court,
INT’L HERALD TRIB., July 7, 2007, http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/07/07/europe/
EU-GEN-Russia-European-Court.php. There are thousands of rights cases pending before
the ECHR, Michael Schwirtz, European Court Assails Russia over Killings in Chechnya, INT’L.
HERALD TRIB., July 26, 2007, http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/07/26/news/russia.php,
and the Court has found the Russian Federation liable for hundreds of thousands of dollars in payments to victims of the Chechen wars. Top Russian Judge Calls for Barring Citizens
from Appealing to European Court, supra. Russian cases make up 22.6 percent of the ECHR’s
total caseload. Schwirtz, supra.
366. Numerous Complaints at European Court Point to Legal Crisis in RF, ITAR-TASS, July 18,
2007, available at 7/18/07 ITARTASSNWS 03:02:00 (Westlaw).
367. Id.
368. Russia Seeks to Restrict Flow of Chechen Complaints to European Court on Human Rights,
INT’L. HERALD TRIB., July 20, 2007, http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/07/20/europe/
EU-GEN-Russia-European-Court.php.
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ing the direct applicability and direct effect of Russia’s international human rights treaties.”369
VI.

“IT’S NOT GETTING EASIER BY THE HOUR”:
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

At first glance, recent developments related to the NGO law
might make Babushka’s eyes light up, satisfied in the knowledge
that she was right to hedge her bets. Examining the situation more
closely, however, makes clear that, on balance, things are indeed
not getting easier by the hour for Russia’s NGO community.370
And, in fact, things may grow worse still.
A.

A Looming Pattern of Bureaucratic Coercion, Threats, and Pressure

Russia’s Presidential Council for Human Rights and Assistance
in the Development of Civil Society Institutions has estimated that
NGOs collectively have spent an estimated $280 million on reporting to the FRS—approximately three percent of their annual budgets.371 According to Pavel Chikov of the Agora Interregional
Human Rights Association, 80 percent of Russian NGOs failed to
submit their first activity report to the FRS by the April 15, 2007,
deadline.372 Those organizations that managed to file their reports
typically had to divert staff resources from other projects. For
example, the World Wildlife Fund’s final report was 100 pages long
and “occupied a good portion of the organization’s Russia-based
staff for two weeks.”373 A clear consensus concerning the impact of
the law’s reporting requirements is evident within the NGO community.374 Activists claim that they are “suffocating under the addi369. Peter Krug, Internalizing European Court of Human Rights Interpretations: Russia’s
Courts of General Jurisdiction and New Directions in Civil Defamation Law, 32 BROOK. J. INT’L L.
1, 3 (2006).
.”
370. The proverb reads accordingly in the original Russian: “
371. Josh Wilson & Tanya Chebotarevo, Only a Matter of Time: NGOs Face New Reporting
Requirements, RUSS. PROFILE, May 3, 2007, http://www.russiaprofile.org/page.php?pageid=
Politics&articleid=a1178190102.
372. Russia: Civil Society and Human Rights Highlights, NGO Law Causing Major
Problems, http://www.finrosforum.fi/?p=244&language=en. This figure is confirmed by
the FRS, which announced that “only 20-25% of all registered organizations managed to
submit annual reports,” which translates into hundreds of thousands of NGOs facing the
threat of liquidation. Mikhail Moshkin, NGOs Beg To Be Rid of Redundant Bureaucratic Oversight, July 5, 2007, available at 7/5/07 WHATPAPERS 00:00:00 (Westlaw). By April 5, ten
days before expiry of the reporting deadline, FRS reported that “only 1,500 of some
200,000 NGOs operating in the country had submitted their paperwork.” NGO Annual
Report Deadline Passes, MOSCOW TIMES, Apr. 17, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 7219346.
373. Wilson & Chebotarevo, supra note 371.
374. Id.
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tional paperwork,”375 that it is “nearly impossible to cope . . .
especially for small organizations,” and that the repeated obligation to report “distracts [NGO] attention from their main tasks—
charitable, humanitarian and human rights programs.”376 With
respect to human rights NGOs, the situation appears even bleaker.
According to Oleg Orlov of Memorial, a leading Russian human
rights NGO, “[t]hese days, the regime reduces all dialogue with
[NGOs] . . . . The FSB constantly interferes. Our activists are intimidated and urged to inform on other activists. The human rights
situation has never been so bad.”377
Similar to its position during the lead up to the October 2006
registration deadline, the FRS again attempted to minimize concerns surrounding the April 2007 reporting deadline. One highly
placed official told the press the following:
We expect the process to proceed quietly and the documents
will be submitted on time, which is the most important thing. If
questions arise, they will be dealt with on the way . . . . The new
form of reporting will not be easy for some organizations. But
there’s nothing fatal in it and I wouldn’t make a problem of
it.378

In another unconvincing press statement, an FRS spokesperson
commented that
There won’t be any serious consequences. . . . There is a law.
Everything will be done according to the law. . . . We work exclusively according to the law. Those measures that are written in
the law will be the measures that we take.379

Such assurances, however, leave much to be decided later and also
much to be desired, particularly in light of the bureaucracy’s past
practice and the actual content of the NGO law. As noted above,
failure to report—as well as errors in reporting—may indeed be
fatal, by triggering the threat of FRS action against an NGO,
including liquidation proceedings. Furthermore, vague or over375. NGO Annual Report Deadline Passes, supra note 372.
376. Rights Groups See Problems Emerging as Deadline for NGO Reports Expires, INTERFAX
RUSS. & FSU NEWS BULL., Apr. 15, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 7778231. For additional
NGO reaction to the April 15 reporting deadline, see Svetlana Osadchuk, NGOs Scramble to
Meet Deadline, MOSCOW TIMES, Apr. 12, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 6927749; Rights Activists Warn NGOs May Have Difficulty in Meeting All Requirements of New Law, INTERFAX RUSS. &
FSU NEWS BULL., Mar. 23, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 5776984.
377. Alexander Voronov, Human Rights Activists in Russia Deprived of Rights According to
FIDH Report, July 27, 2007, available at 7/27/07 WHATPAPERS 00:00:00 (Westlaw).
378. Rights Groups See Problems Emerging, supra note 376. The acknowledgement that it
would “not be easy” also contradicts Movchan’s assurances that NGOs have been through
this process already and are familiar with it. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
379. Arnold, supra note 195.
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broad provisions in the law will be left to the subjective discretion
of FRS officials interpreting the law. Consider, for example, the
grounds invoked by the FRS to deny registration to Great Russia,
an anti-immigrant political party co-founded by former Rodina
head Dmitry Rogozin. The FRS based its decision on a finding that
the party’s charter violated the law on political parties (although a
spokesperson for Great Russia claimed it was identical to that of
another pro-Kremlin party that successfully registered previously)
and other errors, including “a spelling mistake on a financial
document.”380
Coupled with reporting concerns, the FRS continued to take specific action against NGOs with a reputation for irking the government. For example, Human Rights Watch reported that the
International Defense Assistance Center, a Russian NGO representing Russian citizens before the ECHR, received an invoice for back
taxes and penalties totaling $167,000—a bill that appears aimed at
shutting down the organization, which has 250 cases pending
before the ECHR.381
In a similar manner, the Educated Media Foundation (EMF)382
was forced to shut down in the wake of a series of seemingly unconnected, even if orchestrated, events.383 In January 2007, customs
officials at Moscow’s Sheremetyevo Airport detained EMF executive director, Manana Aslamazian, for allegedly bringing an
undeclared “sizeable” amount of cash into Russia.384 A criminal
investigation was subsequently opened against Aslamazian on Janu380. Natalya Krainova, David Nowak, & Alexander Osipovich, Great Russia Refused Registration, MOSCOW TIMES, July 25, 2007, at 1.
381. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Russia, in WORLD REPORT 2007, supra note 12, at 407.
382. The EMF, formerly known as Internews Russia, is part of Internews Network, a
California-based NGO that promotes independent media training worldwide. Where We
Work: Eurasia, http://www.internews.org/regions/eurasia/default.shtm (last visited Aug.
15, 2008); About Internews, http://www.internews.org/about/default.shtm (last visited
Oct. 5, 2008). It has branches in 23 countries and receives funding from the U.S. government and private foundations such as the Open Society Institute. Internews – About Us,
http://www.internews.org/about/default.shtm (last visited Aug. 15, 2007). Internews Russia has received $8 million from the U.S. Agency for International Development since June
2004, including $3.5 million in 2006. Steve Gutterman, Head of U.S.-Funded Group Fled Russia, FOX NEWS, June 29, 2007, http://www.foxnews.com/wires/2007Jun29/0,4670,Russia
NGO,00.html.
383. See Press Release, Internews, Support Journalism Under Attack in Russia (May 27,
2008), http://www.internews.org/prs/2007/20070503_russia.shtm.
384. Svetlana Osadchuk, Raising Fears, Police Officers Raid U.S. NGO, MOSCOW TIMES,
Apr. 19, 2007, at 1. Aslamazian had approximately $12,400. Id. Individuals arriving in
Russia with more than the equivalent of $10,000 must make a customs declaration. Id.
Aslamazian explained that she was unaware of the requirement to declare the money. Id.
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ary 31,385 and by mid-April, officers from the Interior Ministry’s
economic crimes department “locked themselves inside”386 EMF’s
Moscow office, “seizing thousands of documents and computer
servers in [an 11 hour] search that lasted until midnight.”387 The
Interior Ministry acknowledged that the raid on EMF’s office was
“related to a previously opened criminal investigation.”388
Aslamazian observed, however, that the move against EMF represented a warning to other foreign-funded NGOs engaged in politically sensitive activities: “We’re a large, visible organisation, and if
they find some mistakes we’ve made, it will be easy to make an
example of us for others.”389 Due to the seizure of office equipment, the organization was forced to “temporarily halt its activities”
on April 24.390 By June, Aslamazian fled Russia for Paris out of fear
of being jailed on smuggling charges filed against her.391 According to her attorney, “the small amount of money involved should
not have been the basis for criminal prosecution.”392 Unable to
operate because of the on-going criminal probe against it, EMF
began liquidation proceedings in July.393 This move was also facilitated by the Tverskoi District Court’s decision to indefinitely postpone hearing a complaint lodged by Aslamazian over the criminal
investigation proceeding against EMF.394 Ironically, because of the
seizure of information from EMF’s office, EMF may have difficulty
conducting the liquidation process in accordance with the NGO
law.395
An account of the difficulties generated by the amended NGO
law would be incomplete without taking note of the role Russia’s
courts have played in permitting the law to operate without any
meaningful judicial scrutiny. In October 2003, Russia’s Supreme
Court issued Decree No. 5 “Concerning the Application by the
385. Id.
386. Arnold, supra note 195.
387. Top US NGO in Russia May Close Down After Raid, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE ENGLISH
WIRE, Apr. 19 2007, available at 4/19/07 AGFRP 09:10:00 (Westlaw); see also Steve Gutterman, Russian Police Raid U.S.-Funded NGO, A.P., Apr. 20, 2007, available at 4/20/07 APONLINEEUR 05:12:27 (Westlaw).
388. Top US NGO in Russia May Close Down After Raid, supra note 387.
389. Id.
390. U.S. NGO Shuts Down, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Apr. 24, 2007, http://www.sptimes.
ru/index.php?action_id=2&story_id=21421.
391. Gutterman, supra note 382.
392. Id.
393. David Nowak, NGO Starts Liquidation amid Probe, MOSCOW TIMES, July 10, 2007,
available at 2007 WLNR 12988406.
394. Id.
395. See id.
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Courts of General Jurisdiction of Generally-recognized Principles
and Norms of International Law and International Treaties of the
Russian Federation,” which established that the European Convention—as well as all other international agreements to which Russia
was a party—is binding on Russia’s legal system and that, wherever
applicable, lower courts must “take into account” the ECHR’s
“practice” so as “to avoid violations of the [European Convention].”396 As Peter Krug has pointed out, however, this directive is
“indeterminate as to its scope and to the nature of the legal effect
to be given to [ECHR] ‘positions.’”397 Similarly, it offers little clarification as to the meaning of the phrase “take into account,” thus
leaving unanswered whether ECHR judgments should be treated
“as binding precedent, or something more akin to persuasive
authority.”398 Krug’s conclusion is that Decree No. 5 demands only
“a mid-level degree of bindingness,” whereby the courts are
“required to act preventively, to avoid an unreasonably high level
of risk that their decisions ultimately will result in findings of violation” by the European Court.399
Given the nature of some of the cases discussed here, it is
unlikely that the Russian courts are satisfying even this “mid-level”
threshold of respect for the 2003 Decree. In neglecting this threshold, however, the courts may be satisfying the desires of certain
government officials, who share with Stalin’s Commissar of Justice
Nikolai Krylenko a common vision of the judiciary as “an organ of
state administration . . . designed . . . to carry out one and the same
governmental policy.”400 Significantly, under President Putin,
fewer court challenges have been brought before Russia’s constitutional court, and the “cases that [do] address the constitutionality
of [his] legislative initiatives tend to go his way.”401 While the court
remains institutionally “one of the few actors capable of standing
up to Putin . . . it has rarely done so.”402

396. Krug, supra note 369, at 28-29. Krug refers to the Decree as “The October 10,
2003 Explanation.” See id. at 28.
397. Id. at 43.
398. Id. This characteristic vagueness should be familiar to readers by this point.
399. Id. at 44.
400. Kahn, supra note 115, at 380.
401. Hendley, supra note 364, at 359.
402. Id.
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Windows of Hope?

“It Was Smooth on Paper, but We Forgot About the Ravines
(and Now We’ll Have to March over Them)”: The NGO Law
and Its Impact on Religious Organizations in Russia

Despite its track record, signs exist that the Russian government
may be prepared to address some of the most egregious shortcomings of the NGO law. Foremost among these indicators is the decision reached by a government commission chaired by then First
Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev403 to exempt religious
organizations404—the proverbial ravine in this instance—from the
NGO law’s reporting requirements.405 A subsequent decree issued
on April 10, 2007, promulgated new regulations for religious organizations “when it comes to accounting for services and donations”406 and also extended the reporting deadline for those
organizations from April 15 to June 1, 2007.407
403. Note from the Editors: At the time this Article was written, Dmitry Medvedev was
First Deputy Prime Minister. He is now President of Russia.
404. Russian officials initially claimed religious organizations were exempt from the
NGO law and that it would have no impact on their activities. Interview with Nikolay
Spassky, Deputy Sec’y of the Russian Fed’n Sec. Council, in Moscow, Russian Federation
(June 21, 2006). This assertion was either ill-informed or disingenuous. Article 1(4) of the
amended NGO law specifies that Articles 13-19, 21-23, and 28-30 shall not be applicable to
religious organizations. Federal Law on Nonprofit Organizations, 1996, No. 7-FZ, art.
1(4), available at http://www.usig.org/countryinfo/russia.asp (scroll down to “Applicable
Laws”), amended by Federal Law on Introducing Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of
the Russian Federation, 2006, No. 18-FZ, art. 3, available at http://www.usig.org/countryinfo/russia.asp (scroll down to “Applicable Laws”). Based on these exemptions, most of
the law’s registration, organization, and liquidation procedures effectively do not apply to
religious organizations in Russia. That said, some of the most onerous features of the
amended NGO law did apply to religious organizations prior to the April 10, 2007 decree.
In particular, Article 32, which establishes exhaustive reporting obligations for NGOs and
extensive state powers to intervene in NGO activities, was applicable to religious organizations. The provisions addressing the registration, organization, and liquidation of religious
organizations in Russia are set out in Federal Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations, 1997, No. 125-FZ, available at http://www.legislationline.org/legislation.
php?tid=2&lid=584&less=false. This law, like the NGO law, gives rise to concerns regarding registration regimes, administrative discretion, arbitrariness, and subjective application. See supra Part V.C. (discussing the Salvation Army case and Fed. Law No. 125-FZ);
supra note 132 (briefly explaining Fed. Law No. 125-FZ).
405. The proverb used here,
, reflects the proposition that sometimes well-laid plans overlook obvious
obstacles (in this case, the Russian Orthodox Church), which in turn threaten to upset
execution of the plan.
406. Religious Groups Get a Waiver, MOSCOW TIMES, Mar. 12, 2007, at 5.
407. Geraldine Fagan, Religious Organisations’ NGO Law Financial Accounting Simplified,
FORUM 18 NEWS SERVICE, Apr. 17, 2007, http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_
id=943.
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To reach this compromise, leaders from a wide range of religious communities in Russia were obliged to lobby vigorously. Russian Orthodox, Protestant, Muslim, and Jewish leaders publicly
criticized the application of Article 32 to religious organizations
after realizing that it would compel them to report on “how many
parishioners attend every service, how much parishioners give to
their religious organizations, and what is discussed at meetings of
senior religious officials.”408 According to Xenia Chernega, an
attorney for the Moscow Patriarchate, the Russian Orthodox
Church (ROC) would “experience a ‘hardship’” under the new system of reporting, and religious organizations could not “be placed
in the same category of [NGOs].”409 Furthermore, Rabbi Zinovy
Kogan, chairman of the Congress of Jewish Religious Communities
and Organizations in Russia, observed that “the new accounting
rules [were] an encroachment on the internal life of the church,”
and Ravil Gainutdin, chairman of the Council of Muftis of Russia,
commented that “such monitoring [was] unacceptable in democratic conditions . . . . The state’s business is to register a religious
organization, not to count how many people come or how much
money they give.”410
According to the new reporting form, instead of specifying types
of activities, objectives, and number of participants, religious organizations only have to indicate whether they have “conducted religious rites, preaching, education, literature distribution, pilgrimage,
charitable work and/or ‘other’ activities.”411 Religious organizations must still “account for donations made by outside organizations as well as for ‘use of other property.’”412
At first glance, the waiver extended to religious organizations
appears to indicate Russian authorities’ willingness to remain flexible with respect to correcting the NGO law’s obvious flaws. An
understanding of the ROC’s rising influence in Russia, however,
and particularly its growing ties to the government, arguably colors
Russian officials’ motives enough to make it impossible to interpret
408. Religious Groups Get a Waiver, supra note 406.
409. Pavel Korobov, Religious Organizations Appeal New Accountability, KOMMERSANT, Dec.
8, 2006, http://www.kommersant.com/p728559/r_1/noncommercial_organizations_
religious_freedom/.
410. Id.
411. Geraldine Fagan, Religious Communities’ New NGO Law Reporting Requirements,
FORUM 18 NEWS SERVICE, Apr. 17, 2007, http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_
id=944.
412. Religious Groups Get a Waiver, supra note 406.
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the move as motivated by anything more than a need to appease
the ROC.413
Christian Orthodoxy has burgeoned in Russia after years of
repression under the Soviet regime. According to the FRS, there
are 22,500 registered religious organizations in Russia, and 55 percent of these are registered to the ROC.414 Today, “Church hierarchs attend every secular event of importance, and politicians
have become exemplary parishioners. The Church is positioning
itself as a stronghold of domestic values and basic morals.”415 Notably, two of Putin’s then potential successors—first deputy prime
ministers Sergei Ivanov and Dmitry Medvedev—have spoken favorably about the role of the ROC in Russian society. For example,
Medvedev has commented that the state “must create conditions to
satisfy a need of a person to go to church, . . . [and] the Church
assumes the function of improving the society.”416 To underscore
the contentious nature of this burgeoning relationship, a group of
prominent academics at the Russian Academy of Sciences recently
published an open letter to President Putin, expressing concern
over “the growing clericalisation of the Russian society” and “an
active penetration of the church into all spheres of public life.”417
It is also worth noting that Russia’s 1993 Constitution explicitly
declares the state secular: under Article 14, “[t]he Russian Federation is a secular state. No religion may be instituted as state-sponsored or mandatory. Religious associations are separated from the
state, and are equal before the law.”418
The growing proximity between the ROC and state is further
cemented by their shared disdain of western-funded NGOs, and
particularly those advancing human rights in Russia. For example,
Metropolitan Kirill, external affairs spokesman of the Moscow
Patriarchate of the ROC, has publicly argued that human rights
groups “advance the political agendas of those foreigners who fund
413. For a closer examination of the breakdown of separation of church and state in
Russia and the growing role of the Russian Orthodox Church, see Robert C. Blitt, How to
Entrench a De Facto State Church in Russia: A Guide in Progress, 2008 BYU L. REV. 707-78.
414. Interview with FRS Senior Staff, supra note 134. The remaining 45 percent breaks
down as follows: 20 percent Protestant, 20 percent Muslim, and 5 percent other. Id.
415. Vladimir Simonov, Religion Clashes with Science in Modern Russia, RIA NOVOSTI, July
23, 2007, http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20070723/69513908.html.
416. Scientists Alarmed by Clericalisation in Russia, ROC Disagrees, RUSSIAN COURIER, July
26, 2007, http://www.russiancourier.com/en/news/2007/07/26/75608/.
417. Id. Nobel Prize winners Zhores Alferov and Vitaly Ginzburg were among some of
the letter’s signers. Id.
418. Constitution, supra note 60, art. 14.
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their activities.”419 To address this situation, Kirill has suggested
that Russia “reserves the right to deviate from international human
rights norms to correct the ‘harmful emphasis’ on ‘heightened
individualism’ which has infiltrated Russian society under the cover
of Russian civil society organizations.”420
Given the shared vision of the ROC and the Russian government
concerning the danger of “western”-driven NGO activities on the
fragile fabric of Russian society, it is not difficult to imagine the
ROC’s eager endorsement of the NGO law and its regulatory provisions. What must have been disconcerting, however, was the heavyhandedness of the government’s “spray and pray” approach to regulation. In a letter to the FRS, Russian Orthodox Archbishop
Nikon (Vasyukov) of Ufa and Sterlitamak summed up the ROC’s
mixed feelings regarding its endorsement of the government effort
and its utter confusion:
We understand the state’s close interest in the activity of all
types of social and so-called “human rights” organisations which
. . . are actively financed by foreign secret services and openly
conduct provocative and anti-Russian activity, but it is completely incomprehensible why this interest has been transferred
to the activity of traditional religious organisations like the Russian Orthodox Church. . . . In our opinion the accounting stipulated amounts to state interference in the activity of religious
organisations unprecedented since Soviet times.421

419. CHALLENGE TO CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 9, at 6. The Russian Orthodox Church
elected Metropolitan Kirill as Patriarch following the death of Aleksy II. He was enthroned
as the 16th Patriarch of Moscow and all of Russia in a ceremony on February 1, 2009. Kirill
is the first Russian Patriarch to be appointed since the fall of the former Soviet Union.
Sophia Kishkovsky, Russian Orthodox Church Elects Outspoken Patriarch, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28,
2009, at A10, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/28/world/europe/28orthodox.html; Torrey Clark & Paul Abelsky, Russian Church Enthrones First Post-Soviet Patriarch
Kirill, BLOOMBERG, Feb. 1, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601095&
sid=aesy4o.micyg&refer=east_europe.
420. Id. at 7.
421. Fagan, supra note 407 (quoting an uncited Interfax report that published the letter) (second alteration in original). It is worth calling attention here to Archbishop
Nikon’s use of the term “traditional” religious organizations as those being entitled to a
waiver regarding reporting obligations. USCIRF has observed that “Many of the problems
faced by minority religious communities in Russia stem from the notion set forth in the
preface to [Fed. Law No. 125-FZ] that only four religions—Russian Orthodoxy, Islam,
Judaism, and Buddhism—have ‘traditional’ status in that country. Other religious groups
are held to be ‘non-traditional,’ and their activities and leaders are subject to official oversight and possible restrictions.” USCIRF, POLICY FOCUS: RUSSIA (2006), available at http://
www.uscirf.gov/images/stories/pdf/Policy_Focus/Russia.pdf. In Archbishop Nikon’s
mind, therefore, it is more than acceptable that other “non-traditional” religious organizations in Russia continue to be bound to the NGO law’s reporting requirements.
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In summary, it would be short-sighted to interpret the decision
to waive reporting obligations for religious organizations under
Article 32 as anything more than a thinly veiled effort to appease
the ROC and ensure its continued support of the government and
its policies.
2.

Much Ado About Talk of Future Amendments

Ella Pamfilova, head of the Council on the Institutions of Civil
Society and Human Rights under former President Putin, recently
commented that elements of the Russian government, including
the FRS, “are jointly monitoring the implementation of the NGO
law” and would propose amendments based on their findings.422
This move apparently grew out of a realization that “whether the
authorities wanted it or not, the accountability mechanism has in
itself become repressive,”423 as well as out of Putin’s statement that
“the existing instructions concerning the law on NGOs are overly
bureaucratic.”424
In a related development, the Public Chamber425 held a consultation on June 20, 2007, with NGO representatives on “new legal
working conditions” for foreign NGOs, where participants spoke of
how registration requirements are “seriously obstructing their
work.”426 Also in June, a group of leading human rights NGOs sent
an appeal letter to all 450 Duma deputies requesting changes to
the NGO law.427 While the arguments being raised by opponents
of the NGO law do not differ significantly from those raised prior
to the law’s adoption, they do carry the added weight of experi422. Pamfilova Says NGO Law May Be Amended, INTERFAX, July 4, 2007, reprinted in Johnson’s Russia List, 2007-#148, July 5, 2007, http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/2007-14832.cfm. Previously, Pamfilova observed that “the [NGO] law creates so much red tape that
many organizations can’t cope.” Pamfilova Calls for Changes to NGO Law, MOSCOW TIMES,
Oct. 25, 2006, at 3.
423. Pamfilova Says NGO Law May Be Amended, supra note 422.
424. Moshkin, supra note 372.
425. In the wake of the Beslan massacre, the Russian government established the Public Chamber to serve as an advisory body of civil society representatives to the president.
FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD - RUSSIA (2006), available at http://freedom
house.org/inc/content/pubs/fiw/inc_country_detail.cfm?year=2006&country=7044&pf.
One-third of its members are appointed by the president, and the presidential appointees
select the remaining members. Id. Although the Public Chamber ostensibly is supposed to
monitor the activity of civil society, it has been criticized as a “meaningless body” essentially
created as “window dressing.” Id. According to Nikolay Petrov, “On the whole . . . the
Public Chamber, is largely a meaningless institution.” Nikolay Petrov, All Smoke and Mirrors,
MOSCOW TIMES, July 20, 2007, at 8.
426. Russia: Civil Society and Human Rights Highlights, WORLD NEWS CONNECTION, July 3,
2007, available at 7307 WRLDNWSC 100335 (Westlaw).
427. Id.
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ence. According to Dmitriy Makarov of the Youth Human Rights
Movement (MPD), “many of the fears expressed by rights activists
when the changes were passed in 2006 have been borne out. We
hope now that our recommendations will be considered. After all,
better late than never.”428
More than any talk of recommendations, three internal realities
weigh in favor of the government formulating at least some superficial amendments: first, the law has already “neutralized” a number
of key organizations; second, the NGO sector has already received
a strong message concerning the boundaries of permissible operation;429 and third, the reporting process will have significant financial and personnel costs for the state. Russian economists have
calculated that if each NGO report submitted is processed “in
about 45 minutes, it will still require 140 employees each year to
complete the process.”430
VII.

“IT’S BETTER TO BE TOO AWARE THAN TOO UNAWARE”
“WHAT YOU PLANT, THAT YOU WILL HARVEST”:
A BRIEF CONCLUSION

OR

To conclude this analysis, two Russian proverbs appear equally
relevant. The first acknowledges the warning bell nature of this
paper, given the reality that—despite the number of incidents discussed above—much in the NGO law still remains unenforced.431
Being overcautious, however, is not without its merits. An authoritative human rights critique of the NGO law’s immediate dangers—as well as its long-term implications—can generate greater
public awareness, which in turn strengthens the hand of Russian
civil society. The strength of Russian civil society is of increasing
428. Id. Human rights NGOs have focused on amending three key areas of the law:
restricting FRS inspection powers, streamlining registration and re-registration procedures,
and streamlining NGO reporting obligations to the FRS. See Moshkin, supra note 372.
429. According to Oleg Kalugin, a former KGB general, this is Putin’s modus operandi.
See Amanda Rivkin, Seven Questions: A Little KGB Training Goes a Long Way, FOREIGN POL’Y,
July 2007, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3911. While Stalin used
mass repressions and imprisoned and executed hundreds of thousands, Putin “is more
selective: [only] individuals who he finds too hostile or harmful for his rule [are targeted].
Putin has actually put the country back to the authoritarian state; it’s not as bloody but just
as criminal as Stalin’s regime.” Id. Indeed, Irina Yasina, chairperson of Russia’s Regional
Journalists Association, has argued that the case brought against the EMF is “all about
making an example of one to scare others.” Jamey Gambrell, Putin Strikes Again, N.Y. REV.
BOOKS, July 19, 2007, at 74, 75. Putin took a similar approach in his dealings with Russia’s
oligarchs. See supra text accompanying notes 115-16.
430. Wilson & Chebotarevo, supra note 371.
431. The proverb reads accordingly in the original Russian: “
.”

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1016367

82

The Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev.

[Vol. 40

import in the face of competing developments such as Russia’s suspension of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe,432
its military campaign in Georgia, the on-going diplomatic row
between the United Kingdom and Russia over the extradition of
businessman Andrei Lugovoi, who is wanted in connection with
the Alexander Litvinenko murder, and rising diplomatic tensions
with the United States.
That said, in the final analysis, this paper represents more than a
mere warning to be “too aware.” Rather, it rejects the “wait and
see” approach advocated by some.433 As one observer of the Russian NGO law has reasoned:
Russian civil society may be threatened if uniform and objectively fair standards are not applied in implementing the latest
law regulating NGOs. . . . While many human rights groups and
NGOs complain that the new law in Russia will result in the end
of civil society, this is unlikely to be the case. Similar laws in
other countries have not resulted in such an outcome and,
therefore, much will depend on the effective implementation of
fair and uniform methods to enforce the new law.434

If anything, this paper has demonstrated the fact that the situation in Putin’s Russia today is sui generis and that no comparison
with other countries or similar NGO laws can paint an adequate or
accurate picture of the implications for Russia’s civil society.435 In
the context of Russia, it is not an issue of whether civil society may
be threatened by the failure to implement uniform and objectively
fair standards; the reality is such that civil society is being threatened
by such standards and that these standards are an inherent part of
the legal culture President Putin facilitates.436 Putin has gone to
432. Information on the Decree “On Suspending the Russian Federation’s Participation in the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and Related International
Agreements,” http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/docs/2007/07/137839.shtml.
433. See, e.g., Schmemann, supra note 5 (concluding that “Russia is still a work in
progress.”).
434. Michael P. Maxwell, NGOs in Russia: Is the Recent Russian NGO Legislation the End of
Civil Society in Russia?, 15 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 235, 262-63 (2006). The key difference
is that those other countries are not Russia.
435. To understand Putin’s regime, Garry Kasparov, former world chess champion and
chairman of the United Civil Front of Russia, a pro-democracy opposition organization,
urges that observers “go directly to the fiction department and take home everything you
can find by Mario Puzo. If you are in a real hurry to become an expert on the Russian
government, you may prefer the DVD section, where you can find Mr. Puzo’s works on
film. ‘The Godfather’ trilogy is a good place to start.” Garry Kasparov, Don Putin, WALL ST.
J., July 26, 2007, at A13.
436. It appears this legal culture will continue to be dominated by Putin, whether acting in his current capacity as Prime Minister or again—at some point in the future possibly
as early as 2009—as President. As Prime Minister, “Putin has taken wide-ranging powers to
run the country and has extended his reach into foreign policy, traditionally the reserve of
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great lengths to shape the media437 and the political landscape of
Russia, and civil society will be no exception to this trend. As this
Article goes to print, the state is expanding rapidly into the nonprofit sector, shaping civil society institutions to suit itself. A telling
example of this is the fact that President Putin in July 2007 signed a
directive on government support for NGOs participating in the
development of institutions of civil society.438 According to the
plan, the government will grant six select Russian NGOs approximately 1.2 billion rubles for the allocation of grants to other organizations.439 This move to impose further controls on civil society
through direct government funding of select organizations reinforces the prescient words of Russian journalist Vitaly Pornikov,
written in 1999:
[Russia] will be a state, in which the government draws authority
not from the enthusiasm of the active members of society, but
from the secret services and the army elites . . . . The federal
authorities will claim as much power and influence . . . as they

the President.” Tony Halpin, Putin Could Return as Russia’s President as Early as 2009, TIMES
ONLINE, Nov. 6, 2008, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article5098
669.ece. In the wake of 16 harried days in November 2008, the stage is now being set for
Putin’s return to the presidential office. The State Duma, following President Medvedev’s
lead, voted overwhelming to amend Russia’s Constitution and extend the presidential term
from four years to six. According to some media reports, the proposal is “sailing through
the constitutional amendment process with virtually no [public] input or discussion.”
Peter Fedynsky, Russian Presidential Term Extension Sailing Through Approval Process, VOICE OF
AMERICA, Nov. 21, 2008, http://www.voanews.com/english/2008-11-21-voa49.cfm. Final
passage of the amendment will require approval from three quarters of the upper house of
parliament and at least two-thirds of the Russian Federation’s 83 regional legislatures. Russian MPs vote for Longer Presidency, REUTERS UK, Nov. 21, 2008, http://uk.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUKTRE4AK2OS20081121. According to Vedomosti, a Russian daily, the
constitutional amendment is “part of a calculated plan to restore Mr Putin to the Kremlin.”
Halpin, supra.
437. Recently, some opposition parties and independent media sources have claimed
that “murky forces have committed vast resources to hacking and crippling their Web sites
in attacks similar to those that hit tech-savvy Estonia as the Baltic nation sparred with Russia
over a Soviet war memorial.” Russia Accused of Crippling Online Media, WASH. TIMES, July 22,
2007, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2007/jul/22/russia-accused-of-cripplingonline-media/. The groups all blame the Kremlin, “calling the electronic siege an attempt
to stifle Russia’s last source of free, unfiltered information.” Id.
438. Igor Romanov, The Duma Has Raised Its Hand Against Education, NEZAVISIMAYA
GAZETA, July 9, 2007, reprinted in Johnson’s Russia List, 2007-#151, July 10, 2007.
439. Id. Some of the biggest recipients of this grant will be the National Charitable
Foundation, the foundation for the training of a personnel reserve for the State Club, the
Znaniye Foundation, and In Support of Civil Society. Id. The formula bears more than a
passing resemblance to the one used to appoint the Public Chamber. See supra note 425
and accompanying text.
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will deem necessary. . . . No freedom of speech will exist in this
state.440

With this reality in mind, the second proverb makes for a more
accurate conclusion. It signals that the seeds for undermining or
completely destroying any authentic, independent, and pluralistic
civil society in Russia already have been planted and—if not
removed in time—promise to deliver bitter fruit.441 This pending
harvest is made only more inevitable based on the prior season’s
seeds, sowed to control the political process, regional autonomy,
media, and business, and whose plants already have developed
thick stalks and continue to grow unabated.
As this analysis has demonstrated, there are many shortcomings
with respect to Russia’s amended NGO law. Not only is the law
drafted in a vague manner that significantly expands administrative
discretion, but it also forces NGOs to operate in a legal space that
breeds uncertainty concerning compliance. This environment
ensures a chilling effect on the diversity and direction of NGO
activities and again raises the specter of the Soviet analogy. U.S.
Representative Tom Lantos has observed that Putin’s Russia “bears
an unsettling resemblance to the former Soviet Union, albeit with
consumer goods and a wealthy business class. Voices of criticism,
opposition, and alternative opinion are jailed, curtailed, or come
to practice self-censorship.”442 What is so startling about this parallel of authoritarianism is that it does not end with Putin’s approach
to controlling Russian society. Similarities with the Soviet era
occur in Russia’s reaction to international scrutiny and its response
to international law norms. For example, in objecting to the
release of a U.S. human rights report on Russia, the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs asserted: “we are convinced in the inadmissibility of
the use of the ideas of democracy and human rights as a cover for
interference in internal affairs.”443 On a prior occasion, Putin had

440. Vladimir Vedrashko, Civil Society in Russia: Bearing the Unbearable in the Name of the
State, FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF., Summer/Fall 2002, at 177, 184.
.”
441. The proverb reads accordingly in the original Russian: “
442. Lantos, supra note 26, at 13.
443. Russian Foreign Ministry Commentary Regarding Publication of the US State
Department Report “Supporting Human Rights and Democracy: The U.S. Record – 2006,”
http://www.chile.mid.ru/mre/e07_104.html (last visited Aug. 17, 2008). In a similar manner, the Duma decried the “mounting unprecedented attempts of US interference in Russia’s internal political processes.” State Department Report Provokes Harsh Official Response,
Warnings of “Color” Revolution, WORLD NEWS CONNECTION, Apr. 18, 2007, available at 4/18/
07 WRLDNWSC 19:46:20 (Westlaw).
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expressed his astonishment that “[Russia’s] internal law-making is
of such great interest to foreign governments.”444
A growing pattern of acceptance by Western states and international organizations of Russian noncompliance with international
norms has fueled the assertion of this positivist stance. For example, Nikolay Spassky, deputy secretary of the Russian Federation
Security Council, talked down the original draft of the NGO law as
a “trial balloon,” floated to test the reaction from Europe and the
United States.445 Even in light of the protests raised in the West,
the Russian government undertook only minor changes to the
final version of the law. This pattern sends a message to Russian
policy-makers that there are few, if any, costs involved with violating international norms or treaties to which their country is a
party.446
Confronted with this deteriorating reality, the international community—and particularly the COE—must take concrete measures
to ensure that Russia’s legislation and judicial rulings adhere to the
standards set forth in the European Convention. Seeking repeal of
the NGO law would alleviate many of the concerns raised herein.
The alternative, at a minimum, is for the Russian government to
take steps to amend or clarify problematic provisions and regulations in a manner that ensures the law’s respect for international
human rights.447 Moreover, the rationales invoked by Russian
authorities to justify the NGO law need to be countered head-on,
by explicitly invoking Russia’s international obligations, including
with respect to the proper enforcement of anti-terrorism measures.
Given the government’s track record to date and its continued
direction, there can be no valid justification for delaying this
urgent action.
The obligation to stand up to the deficiencies of the NGO law,
however, does not fall to states and intergovernmental organiza444. Stefan Nicola, Analysis: Merkel’s New Foreign Policy, UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL
(UPI), Jan. 19, 2006. As a touchstone of continuity, Soviet positivism was always “distinguished by the exclusion of customary practice as a source of international obligations.”
Alwyn V. Freeman, Editorial Comment, Some Aspects of Soviet Influence on International Law,
62 AM. J. INT’L L. 710, 713 (1968).
445. Interview with Nikolay Spassky,supra note 404.
446. Sarah E. Mendelson, Russians’ Rights Imperiled: Has Anybody Noticed?, INT’L SEC.,
Spring 2002, at 39, 42.
447. These amendments and clarifications should, inter alia, reflect international best
practices discussed here, as well as recommendations advanced by the COE, USCIRF, and
the international NGO community. The Parliamentary Assembly of the COE is expected
to undertake an evaluation of the implementation of the NGO law within a year of its
enactment. Press Conference with Rene van der Linden, supra note 346.
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tions alone. Russian and international NGOs alike must take concrete steps to increase internal transparency and accountability in a
measurable and objective manner as a means of ensuring quality
within the industry and, moreover, to minimize the risk of exposing themselves to attacks regarding their relevancy or objectivity.448
Some of this is already taking place, but much more needs to be
done to disseminate and meaningfully enforce standards.449
What is being “floated” in Russia today with respect to the regulation of NGOs represents a breach of well-defined and long-standing international human rights standards and best practices. Faced
with this reality, the most fitting way to close this paper is by
reminding the reader of a final Russian proverb: “You can’t throw a
handkerchief over somebody’s mouth.”450 Acting with this maxim
in mind, the international community can remind Russian officials
that the world is watching.

448. See generally Blitt, supra note 19 (arguing that professionalism, standardization, and
meaningful self-regulation of NGOs are essential to their credibility and the continued
significance of the principles they espouse).
449. The recent International NGO Accountability Charter signals some momentum
from within the international NGO community in this direction. However, the charter
does little at this point to promote standards among domestic NGOs or to provide for
outside monitoring with the possibility of sanctions. See generally International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGO), Accountability Charter (Dec. 20, 2005), available at http://
www.ingoaccountabilitycharter.org/download/ingo-accountability-charter-eng.pdf. Also,
the number of signatories only counts in the handfuls. See List of Signatories, http://
www.ingoaccountabilitycharter.org/list-of-signatories.php (last visited Aug. 17, 2008). For
reasons why the charter as it stands is insufficient, see generally Blitt, supra note 19.
450. The proverb reads accordingly in the original Russian: “
.”
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